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ABSTRACT 
EVALUATING ATTENTIONAL BIAS IN SHAME USING THE DOT PROBE TASK 
by 
Kathleen M. Grout, M.S. 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor Shawn P. Cahill, PhD 
 
 
Background: Cognitive theorists have long held that attentional biases are a central 
feature of psychopathology (Beck, 1976). Although shame plays a key role in psychopathology, 
research and theoretical models on information processing in shame is lacking. Objective: The 
considerable overlap both functionally and topographically between shame and negative 
affective states of anxiety and depression prompted our investigation in to whether there are 
attentional biases in shame. Method: We compared individuals with low, moderate, and high 
levels of shame on the dot probe task. We investigated the effect of valence and time course of 
such biases by exposing stimuli portraying disgust, sad, and happy faces at short (150 ms), 
medium (500 ms), and long (1,000 ms) durations. Results: We analyzed dot probe reaction 
times along three indices: conventional bias, facilitated engagement, and difficulty disengaging. 
Our analyses indicated order effects for the conventional bias index, in which the stimulus 
exposure duration impacted individuals with low amounts of shame when the questionnaires 
were administered first. We observed group main effects for our indices of facilitated 
engagement and difficulty disengaging, in which high shame individuals exhibited slowed 
engagement to all affective stimuli and delayed disengagement from all affective stimuli. 
Additional trends in the data are reported. Conclusions: Implications are discussed in terms of 
the perception of affect and social stimuli as threatening. 
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Introduction 
Guilt and Shame 
Discrete emotions theory assumes that there are a set number of core emotional 
responses that are expressed in similar ways universally.  Although there is debate about which 
emotions comprise the core emotions (theorists debate between 7-10 emotions), many theorists 
propose guilt or shame as one of them (Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 
2001). Although shame is often differentiated from guilt in discrete emotions theory, there is no 
consensus on these differences and they overlap on many other key features such as facial 
expressions, functions, cognitive content, and action tendencies (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; 
Lazarus, 1991). Interestingly, a number of authors reveal that laypeople are not familiar with the 
differences between shame and guilt either at the level of facial expression recognition (Izard, 
1991) or verbal differentiation (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Thus, the expression and 
understanding of these emotions seem to intersect in important ways.  
Based on their shared characteristics, guilt and shame can be defined as an internal 
state that is brought about by a violation of social norms and manifests itself through negative 
affect and cognitions. It seems plausible that exploring general shameful affect (including guilt) 
will be more beneficial than differentiating between them, especially at the functional level (i.e. 
motivation for treatment, denial of feelings of remorse, patient understanding of their emotions). 
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, discussion of these emotions will be simplified by 
referring to them both as shameful affect Shameful Affect in Psychopathology 
Guilt and shame are disproportionately understudied compared to other negative affect, 
especially considering the importance guilt and shame play in the development of 
psychopathology. For instance, guilt and shame are associated with social anxiety, eating 
disorders, depression, suicidal behaviors, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Bryan et al, 
2013; Goss & Allan, 2009; Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001). Although the impact of guilt and 
shame in mental illness has long been noted, relatively little is known about shame from an 
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empirical perspective, and the focus of shame in the literature has largely been theoretical. 
Interestingly, theorists suggest that guilt and shame are beneficial at moderate levels, but 
intense feelings of guilt and shame may lead to dysfunctional behaviors (Lazarus, 1991; 
Shahar, 2013). Lewis (1971) explained that experiencing intense and recurrent shame and guilt 
may lead to maladaptive perfectionism, anxiety, sensitivity to rejection, interpersonal difficulties, 
and increased self-reproach. From the existing body of research on shame, there is consistent 
evidence demonstrating the association between shame and psychopathology, particularly 
anxiety and depression (Fergus et al., 2010; Gilbert, 2000; Carvalho, 2013; Kim, Thibodeau, & 
Jorgensen, 2011). It has been proposed that a restricted range of negative cognitions and 
avoidance behaviors in those with shameful affect may influence the development of 
psychopathology (Muris and Meesters, 2013; Lazarus, 1991). 
Cognitive Biases in Shame. Cognitive theorists describe the cognitive triad as thoughts 
about oneself, one’s future, and one’s experiences, which, when taken together, create 
vulnerability to psychopathology (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). In the first part, Beck (1976) 
describes a negative evaluation of oneself in terms of being worthless or morally defective. This 
reflects tendencies in shame, although cognitive theorists do not explicitly implicate shame in 
the cognitive triad (Power, 2009). Also, cognitive theorists describe schemas, mental 
representations of oneself and the world, as contributing to psychopathology (Beck, 1976; 
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Importantly, Beck (1976) explains that individuals selectively 
attend to certain information that is congruent with their schema and selectively ignore other 
incongruent stimuli. For example, a depressed individual may attend to depressing stimuli and 
ignore joyful stimuli, which would reinforce the individual’s schema that the world is a 
depressing place. However, the role of schemas in negative affect excluded a focus on shame. 
Theoretical and empirical focus of traditional cognitive theorists was on attentional and memory 
biases in anxiety and depression. In the literature on guilt and shame there is no empirical 
evidence focusing on cognitive biases in information processing. However, cognitive theories 
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provide a foundation of cognitive patterns in depression and anxiety to build a model of 
cognitive biases in shame around.  The author proposes a cognitive model of attentional biases 
in shame following a review of the literature on attentional biases in other negative affect.  
Although cognitive theorists do not explicitly state the role of shame in psychopathology, 
it is possible that one way shame influences mental health is through various cognitive biases. 
Theorists suggest that those experiencing shame may be more likely to make stable, personal 
attributions for negative events, similar to cognitive theorists’ explanation of depression 
(Andrews, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006). For example, a 
person who experiences high amounts of shame may be more likely to attribute the cause of 
negative life events to permanent characteristics of him- or herself.  This type of attributional 
style is sometimes referred to as self-blame (Andrews, 1995). Such guilt-induced attribution 
styles have been suggested by cognitive psychologists to result in feelings of depression and 
social anxiety (Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006). 
Social psychologist Leary (2004) describes two types of cognitions in shame. First, he 
describes negative self-evaluations, in which an individual consistently evaluates him or herself 
as inferior to others. Second, he described how individuals also make attributions about how 
others are evaluating them. For example, a child may perceive others as judging him or her 
negatively. Evaluating the self as shameful is referred to as “internal shame” in the literature; 
whereas evaluating others as shaming is referred to as “external shame” (Gilbert, 2000; Lee, 
Scragg, & Turner, 2001). Lazarus (1991) adds that subsequent failure to cope with initial 
feelings of shame will lead to thoughts of self-blame in a “secondary appraisal process”.  He 
also suggests that self-blame can be thought of as misdirected attributions of responsibility, a 
clearly maladaptive pattern.    
Avoidance. The unwillingness to experience negative affect, called “avoidance”, has 
been suggested to play a role in depression as well as anxiety disorders, such as PTSD (Foa 
and Kozak, 1986; Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001).  As described by Lazarus (1991) and Izard 
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(1991), those who experience shame often have the tendency to hide or turn away, which 
topographically resembles overt avoidance behavior. Lee, Scragg, and Turner (2001) posited 
that shame may often lead to dysfunctional avoidance coping strategies (e.g., substance abuse, 
staying in bed to, avoiding thoughts and feelings) following a trauma. Muris and Meesters 
(2013) suggest that following repeated shame and self-blame, individuals may come to rely on 
avoidant interpersonal action tendencies, such as isolating, which could lead to anxiety and 
depression. Furthermore, as Foa and Kozak (1986) emphasize, avoidance impedes emotional 
processing of the event. In other words, without emotional processing anxiety symptoms are 
maintained. There is some evidence implicating the link between shame, avoidance, and 
subsequent psychopathology.  For example, avoidant coping was shown to mediate the 
relationship between shame and depressive symptoms in an adolescent sample (De Rubeis & 
Hollenstein, 2009).  In addition, Carvalho (2013) found evidence that avoidance of emotional 
experiences strongly mediated the relationship between shame and depressive symptoms.  
The pattern of avoidance of emotional experiences is common due to the short-term 
decrease in negative emotions. Avoidance becomes problematic when used as a long-term 
coping strategy, because new learning, processing, and coping strategies cannot take place.  
Additionally, avoidance strategies are ineffective because they impair functioning in daily life. 
Therefore, Carvalho (2013) suggests that chronically using avoidance to cope following 
shameful experiences puts individuals at risk for increased psychopathology, such as 
depression. One potential limitation of this study is that, although the design measures shame 
from childhood and current avoidance and depressive symptoms, a cause-effect pattern cannot 
be determined due to the correlational design. The analog sample also limits any conclusions 
that can be made regarding those who are clinically depressed. Also, there are limitations in 
memory for events in the distant past. Especially in light of the evidence on avoidance in shame, 
the question arises whether self-report questionnaires can accurately detect shame in 
individuals who are most avoidant of painful emotional experiences.  
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Not only does avoidance in shame play a role in the development and maintenance of 
psychopathology symptoms, but this may also act as a barrier to entering treatment (Levin, 
1971).  In addition, many authors suggest that clients may be unable or reticent to reveal 
feelings of shame in session due to its speechless nature (Levin, 1971; Feiring & Taska, 2005; 
Izard, 1991). Not only do many individuals deny their experience of shame, they also tend to 
avoid reflecting on it (Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Carvalho, 2013). According to emotional 
processing theory, reflecting on and processing events may lead to symptom improvements 
(Foa and Kozak, 1991; Shahar, 2013). Thus, the avoidance aspect of shame may inhibit 
individuals from seeking treatment, communicating feelings of shame to their provider, and 
active processing of feelings of shame.  
Shame in Anxiety.  The body of research indicates that shame plays a prominent role in 
certain anxiety disorders, such as Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD), Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder (GAD), Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and especially Social Anxiety Disorder 
(SAD). The association between shame and anxiety could be attributed to the overlap in 
symptoms of depression and anxiety, considering shame plays a role in depression as well. 
However, Fergus et al. (2010) found that shame was associated with GAD and SAD even when 
controlling for depressive symptoms. Furthermore, using standardized measures the authors 
found that changes in shame pre-to-post-treatment were associated with changes in GAD, SAD, 
and obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  
  PTSD.  Shame in PTSD has garnered more attention in the literature than many other 
disorders. From a conceptual perspective, Lee, Scragg, and Turner (2001) posit that internal 
and external shame influence schemas following a trauma in different ways. Following a trauma, 
an individual may experience internal shame when a trauma confirms negative self-evaluations 
(e.g., that s/he is weak). In terms of external shame, an individual may feel devalued by others 
(e.g., that others believe s/he is weak).  
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Literature on shame and guilt in PTSD is largely conceptual; however, there is some 
data that connects shameful affect with trauma symptomology. For example, guilt may be 
associated with PTSD symptomology, but results are mixed (Leskela, Dieperink, & Thuras, 
2002). Shame, on the other hand, has been found to be significantly and positively correlated 
with PTSD symptom severity in a study examining 107 former prisoners of war using well-
validated measures (Leskela, Dieperink, & Thuras, 2002). However, based on the study design, 
no causal relationship can be determined.  
Andrews et al. (2000) investigated the role of shame in predicting PTSD severity among 
victims of crime-related trauma. Findings showed that shame and anger were the only 
predictors of PTSD severity one month post-trauma, and shame was the only predictor of PTSD 
severity six months post-trauma. They also found a significant correlation between a history of 
childhood abuse and current PTSD symptoms, and shame mediated this association.  This and 
other studies indicate that shame may act as a mediator variable between sexual abuse and 
subsequent psychopathology such as depression, bulimia, and PTSD (Feiring & Taska, 2005; 
Andrews et al., 1995, 2000).   
Social Anxiety. In regards to shame, social anxiety has received the most research 
compared to other anxiety disorders. This is likely due to the notion that shame and social 
anxiety share many features, which has been emphasized by a variety of theorists (Gilbert, 
2000; Matos et al., 2013; Shahar, 2013) and corroborated by some initial research. For 
example, Gilbert (2000) investigated shared aspects of shame, social anxiety, and depression. 
Results confirmed the hypothesis that shame, social anxiety, and depression are correlated with 
feelings of inferiority. Additionally, these three were associated with more submissive social 
behaviors (e.g., agreeing one was wrong). Interestingly, when controlling for social anxiety, 
shame and depression were no longer significantly correlated. On the other hand, when 
depression was controlled for, shame and social anxiety remained significantly correlated. The 
author suggests this implies that the role of shame in depression may operate through social 
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anxiety. However, the author failed to provide a rationale for the samples used (109 psychology 
students; 50 hospitalized depressed patients). Further, it is unclear why the author utilized 
individuals diagnosed with depression but failed to find participants diagnosed with social 
anxiety.  
Conceptually, there are many overlapping characteristics of social anxiety and shame. 
First, they share the element of self-consciousness. Similar to shame, social anxiety is said to 
include self-focused attention, in which awareness is concentrated on an individual’s own 
physiological sensations, emotions, or cognitions (Morrison & Heimberg, 2013). Theorists 
suggest that self-focused attention prevents awareness of new experiences and subsequent 
learning to disprove negative cognitive biases (Clark, 2005; Morrison & Heimberg, 2013). 
Theorists suggest that the heightened awareness of the self may lead to negative self-
evaluation in both social anxiety and shame (Fergus et al., 2010). Repeated self-blame about 
failures and self-criticism involving thoughts of one’s worthlessness and core deficiencies are 
hypothesized to lead to negative self-evaluation in social anxiety and shame (Shahar, 2013).  
Second, social anxiety and shame share the tendency of making attributions of being 
negatively evaluated by others (Clark, 2005; Leary, 2004). In fact, an intense fear of negative 
evaluation from others is considered a central feature of social anxiety (Morrison & Heimberg, 
2013) and is related to the concept of external shame. Clark (2005) describes socially anxious 
individuals as experiencing discomfort in the presence of others and an increased predisposition 
to feelings of embarrassment, which reflects the shame experience as described by Izard 
(1991) and Lazarus (1991).  Therefore, “biased processing of social cues” is implicated by many 
theorists to account for the maintenance of social anxiety (Clark, 2005; Morrison & Heimberg, 
2013).  
Third, they both involve ruminative worry. Clark (2005) describes evidence that 
rumination is association with social anxiety disorder. Although Orth, Berking, and Burkhardt 
(2006) did not examine anxiety in their study, their findings reveal that shame is correlated with 
 8 
 
rumination. Buss (1980) posits that rumination about social contact is associated with both 
shame and social anxiety by means of self-consciousness. 
Fourth, social anxiety and shame have some overlap in regards to behavioral 
tendencies. For example, both are associated with blushing and physiological arousal (Morrison 
& Heimberg, 2013). Further, social avoidance is a hallmark of both shame and social anxiety 
(Clark, 2005). Additional overlapping response styles include unassertiveness and submission 
(Morrison & Heimberg, 2013). 
In his emotion-focused therapy model for social anxiety, Shahar (2013) proposes that 
shame is linked to social anxiety. He describes shame as a primary emotional response to a 
humiliating situation. The resulting social anxiety is a secondary reaction to repeated shame 
experiences, in which worries arise regarding exposure of one’s defects. According to Shahar 
(2013), these worries result in hypervigilance in social settings and information processing 
biases. For example, attention to others may be biased in terms of noticing any signs of 
disapproval (Clark, 2005). Shahar (2013) suggests that shame processing may be the 
mechanism through which social anxiety lessens, and evoking and processing shame should 
therefore be the target of treatment.   
Shame in Depression. A majority of the literature on shame in psychopathology 
focuses on depression. Using a non-clinical sample, Carvalho (2013) found that the frequency 
and intensity of shame-provoking events during childhood was correlated with depressive 
symptoms later in life. In a meta-analysis of 20 studies on shame in children and adolescents, 
results indicated that there is a modest correlation between shame and psychopathology 
symptoms of depression, anger, and aggression/delinquency (Muris & Meesters, 2013). Kim, 
Thibodeau, and Jorgensen (2011) conducted a meta-analysis on 108 correlational studies on 
shame and depression published between 1987 and 2010. Their findings revealed that 
associations with depression were stronger for shame compared to guilt. In addition, larger 
effect sizes were seen in external shame compared to internal shame. Orth, Berking, and 
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Burkhardt (2006) found that rumination mediated the shame-depression link.  They explain the 
significance of their findings by suggesting that rumination may help to problem solve ways to 
maintain belongingness with others, but also results in repeated negative self-evaluation, 
leading to depressive symptoms.   
Although no studies elucidate the causal pathway between shameful affect and 
psychopathology, Frewen et al. (2013) investigated the perceived causal relationship between 
shame and symptoms of anxiety and depression. Individuals were asked to rate their belief as 
to the cause-effect pathway that led to their symptomatology. Results indicated that individuals 
were more likely to attribute shame as a cause of depression than depression as a cause of 
shame. Although results showed that individuals were more likely to attribute anxiety as a cause 
of depression than depression as a cause of anxiety, no relationship was found between shame 
and anxiety, suggesting that individuals may perceive shame to be more similar to their 
experience of depression compared to their experience of anxiety A notable limitation to this 
study is the possibility of introspective limitations and demand characteristics. Individuals may 
not be aware of the presence, degree, or temporal association of certain emotions and 
symptoms, and they may also be motivated to misreport the causal relationships. In addition, 
shame-guilt was assessed by only one-item, limiting its validity as a measure of shameful affect, 
and the study failed to use standardized instruments to assess for other symptoms. Also, it 
seems that understanding the perception of a cause-effect relationship reveals more about 
attributions of the sequence compared to the actual cause-effect relationship.   
In addition to replicating the finding from prior research that shame was associated with 
depressive symptoms, Andrews, Qian, and Valentine (2002) found evidence that shame 
predicted additional significant variance in depressive symptoms at a second time point, 
suggesting that shame may play a role in the development of symptoms. 
Although there is increasing research on the role of shame in psychopathology, there 
are no studies that focus on any level of information processing in shame. Given the 
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relationships between shame and both anxiety and depression, research on attentional biases 
in anxiety and depression may guide initial research on information processing in shameful 
affect at the level of attention biases.  
 
Attentional Biases in Shame-Relevant Affect 
Attention refers to the ability to concentrate, process, and attend to information, and can 
occur at either the conscious or unconscious level. Due to the vast amount of information 
individuals are presented with every moment, the attentional system selects information to 
attend to and information to ignore. Cognitive theorists have long held that attentional biases are 
a central feature of mood disorders (Beck, 1976). The literature on attentional biases in 
psychopathology focuses on anxiety and depression. Although shame plays a key role in 
psychopathology, research and theoretical models on information processing in shame is 
lacking. Because both attention biases and shameful affect influence psychopathology it is of 
crucial importance to determine the existence and patterns of attentional biases in shame. Due 
to the overlap between shame and anxiety/depression, as aforementioned, understanding 
attention processing in anxiety and depression may shed light on possible attention processing 
patterns in shame.  
 
Methodologies of Attention Bias Research 
Studies assessing attentional biases have utilized various methodologies in terms of 
type of paradigm, length of stimuli exposure, and type of stimuli.  
Paradigms. The literature on attention biases is vast and a number of paradigms have 
been generated to assess for biases. Two of the most common methods include the visual dot 
probe task and the emotional Stroop (Bar-Haim, 2007).   
Dot probe. MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986) modified the dot probe task to assess 
visual encoding of threatening stimuli. The dot probe task is a computer-based task that 
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presents a series of threat-neutral (or sad-neutral, etc.) trials to the participant (MacLeod, 
Mathews, and Tata, 1986; Bar-Haim, 2007; Wald et al, 2013). Trials begin with a screen briefly 
(e.g., 500 ms) displaying fixation crosses. Next a threat-neutral word pair (e.g., dead, data) or 
pictorial pair (threatening face, neutral face) is presented briefly (e.g., 500ms, 1000ms). Lastly, 
the words or pictures disappear and a probe (e.g., dots, arrows) appears in the empty space of 
one of the stimuli. In typical dot probes participants are instructed to indicate the identity of the 
probes (e.g.,  one or two dots; arrow up or down) or to indicate the location of the probe (e.g., 
left or right) by making a key press (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Bar-Haim, 2007). The probes are 
present until a response is made. Participants are instructed to respond quickly and accurately. 
Attention vigilance or threat bias is defined as attentional bias towards a threatening cue. 
Conversely, attention avoidance is attentional bias away from a threatening cue (MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Wald et al, 2013). In terms of the dot probe, threat bias is reflected 
when participants are faster at identifying targets that replace threatening stimuli than they are 
at identifying targets that replace non-threatening stimuli. For example, if the participant is faster 
at responding when dots replaced words like “dead” and slower when dots replaced words like 
“data”, this indicates the participant is attending to the word “dead” prior to the target.  
Conversely, threat avoidance is thought to be reflected in participants who are faster to detect 
targets replacing neutral stimuli and slower to detect targets replacing threat stimuli (Wald et al, 
2013). Furthermore, the addition of happy-neutral trials could provide evidence for a bias 
towards or away from positive stimuli (Bar-Haim, 2007).  
Emotional Stroop. The Emotional Stroop is a modification of the color-naming Stroop 
developed in the 1930s (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The original Stroop effect refers to decreased 
performance when incongruent (e.g., the word green printed in red) stimuli are presented 
compared to when congruent stimuli (e.g., the word green printed in green) are presented. 
Semantic incongruence is thought to interfere with the ability to exclusively attend to color. In 
the Emotional Stroop, threat-bias is reflected in decreased performance in naming the color of 
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threat-related stimuli (e.g., the printed color of the word “cancer” or the color of an angry face) 
compared to naming the color of neutral stimuli (e.g., “plate” or a neutral face).  
According to a meta-analysis, both the Stroop and dot probe paradigms are associated 
with significant within-subject and between-group effects. Effect sizes for these two paradigms 
were comparable and did not differ significantly (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). However, some 
researchers have criticized the Stroop on the belief that it may not be measuring attention bias, 
but rather may be measuring avoidance or cognitive preoccupation instead. For example, the 
Stroop requires suppression of a response and ignoring emotion stimuli in order to provide the 
correct response.   
In contrast, the dot probe allows individuals to freely attend to emotion stimuli, which has 
been argued to be a more “naturalistic” paradigm (Gotlib et al, 2004). Another benefit to the dot 
probe is that the probe itself is neutral, thereby allowing response latencies to the probe to be a 
direct assessment of attentional allocation instead of response biases or arousal (Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007). The dot probe also has the added benefit of allowing for variation of the duration 
between the stimulus presentation and the probe, termed the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). 
Exposure of the stimuli may be subliminal or supraliminal. Because of these benefits of the dot 
probe paradigm over the Stroop, research using the dot probe task to measure attention biases 
will be highlighted.  
 
Variants of Dot Probe 
Length of Stimulus Exposure. Examining the time-course of attentional biases is 
imperative in clarifying whether individuals maintain attentional vigilance or show 
disengagement from threatening stimuli. Thus, understanding the impact of the length of stimuli 
exposure on attentional biases is warranted.  
In a meta-analysis Bar-Haim et al. (2007) found significant differences in effect sizes 
between 5 studies that utilized subliminal exposures (< 500 ms) compared to 25 studies that 
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utilized supraliminal exposures (500 - 1000 ms) in dot probe tasks. Threatening stimuli 
presented at all exposure durations produced a significant threat bias in anxious participants, 
although effect sizes for studies using subliminal exposure of stimuli were almost twice the 
effect size of studies using supraliminal exposures; however, there were far fewer subliminal 
studies included in analyses. Bar-Haim et al. (2007) also found differences in nonanxious 
control groups at different exposure times. They found that control groups showed significant 
threat avoidance using subliminal exposure of stimuli, but showed no significant effect at 
supraliminal exposures. Additionally, significant differences were found between anxious 
participants and controls for subliminal and 500 ms stimulus exposure times, but not for longer 
exposure times. Based on this literature, in order to investigate the time-course of attentional 
processing in negative affect, employing multiple stimulus exposure lengths seems optimal to 
assess both early and later attentional patterns.  
Types of Stimuli. Researchers have begun to debate which type of stimuli ─ words or 
faces ─ are optimal to assess attentional biases using the dot probe. A majority of the initial 
research on attention biases in anxiety utilized word stimuli. However, many recent studies have 
begun using pictures of human faces displaying facial expressions. Peschard (2013) suggested 
that pictorial stimuli reveal more accurate findings than studies using word stimuli. He explains 
that the processing of faces involves a separate neural pathway from processing of word stimuli. 
Processing faces is automatic, bypasses semantic processing, and is thought to be more 
indicative of real-world stimuli and attention biases (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 1997; Bar-Haim, 
2007).  
Additionally, theorists have proposed that utilizing word stimuli confounds results due to 
the possibility of variable familiarity of words. Utilizing face stimuli allows researchers to rule out 
word frequency of word usage as a confounding variable. For example, anxious individuals may 
be more likely to use anxiety-related words in conversations or think anxiety-related thoughts. 
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Therefore, these individuals may be primed to notice these words due to their increased usage 
compared to usage among non-anxious individuals (Bradley et al., 1997; Bar-Haim, 2007).   
Researchers have found evidence of a threat bias utilizing word stimuli (MacLeod, 
Mathews, and Tata, 1986; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995; Wald et al, 2013) and face stimuli 
(Gotlib et al., 2004; Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Staugaard, 2010).  However, some 
inconsistencies have emerged. For example, Pishyar, Harris, and Menzies (2004) directly 
compared the impact of faces and words on attentional biases. They found threat bias for faces 
but not words, as they hypothesized. On the other hand, Bradley et al. (1997) had null findings 
relating to threat bias when using facial stimuli. These studies are discussed in more depth 
below. Of importance, a meta-analysis examining 35 dot probe studies indicated that the 
magnitude of threat biases was comparable when using words (20 studies were included in 
analyses) or faces (15 studies) (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).  Both types of stimuli produced biases 
towards threatening information in anxious participants, but not in controls. The meta-analysis 
also revealed that control groups demonstrated threat avoidance for threatening word stimuli, 
but not face stimuli.  Based on this meta-analysis there is no evidence that face stimuli produce 
larger threat biases than word stimuli when using the dot probe. Additionally, more research is 
needed to determine if there is a difference in threat bias between words and pictures as a 
function of stimulus exposure time. One reason to expect a difference is based on differences in 
timing of processing (Peschard et al., 2013). For example, processing faces is said to occur 
quickly whereas semantic processing takes longer (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Therefore, it may 
follow that assessing faces subliminally and words supraliminally may increase the magnitude of 
effect sizes, but more research is needed to determine if this pattern holds.  
Another feature of stimulus type is emotional content. Cognitive theorists predict that 
individuals selectively attend to stimuli that are relevant to their domain of psychopathology, 
referred to as domain-specificity. For example, individuals who are depressed may show 
attention bias to stimuli reflecting sadness whereas individuals with social anxiety may show 
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biases for stimuli involving socially threatening information, such as anger. Research on 
domain-specificity is mixed. Some studies show evidence of an association between content of 
stimulus and domain (Beck, 1976; Gotlib et al., 2004). However, others found no domain-
specificity for threat biases, indicating participants showed a threat bias to any emotional stimuli 
regardless of content (Mogg et al., 1995; Schofield, Inhoff, and Coles (2013). For example, one 
study showed that attentional biases in GAD were not specific to anxiety-related threatening 
words (“attack”, “hostile”), but also included bias towards depression-relevant words (“sad”, 
worthless”) (Mogg et al., 1995).  Interestingly, another study showed that all emotional 
expressions (as opposed to neutral expressions) attracted participants’ attention (Schofield, 
Inhoff, and Coles, 2013). 
Components of Attention Processing. Most dot probe literature measures attention 
biases by comparing reaction times to detect the probe when the probe replaces a valenced 
stimulus, called “congruent” trials, with reaction times to detect the probe when the probe 
replaces a neutral stimulus, called “incongruent” trials.  Thus, positive scores indicated more 
rapid detection of the probe when it replaces a valenced stimulus.  However, it has been noted 
(e.g., Koster et al., 2004) that attention biases can be further decomposed into two distinct 
categories.  Specifically, an attention bias could reflect rapid initial detection of the emotional 
stimulus on relevant trials (called facilitated engagement) on congruent trials or it could reflect 
difficulties moving attention away from the emotional stimulus on incongruent trials (called 
difficulty disengaging).  Researchers (e.g., Fox et al., 2002; Klumpp & Amir, 2009; Koster et al., 
2004; Matlow, Gard, & Berg, 2012) have devised scoring procedures for differentiating these 
two sources of attention bias by comparing reaction times for congruent or incongruent trials 
with reaction times on control trials in which both stimuli are neutral.   
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Attentional Biases in Anxiety 
The following review highlights research trends relating to attentional biases in anxiety 
generally, followed by research trends specifically focused on social anxiety. These literatures 
are emphasized due to the overlap in behavioral tendencies of shame and general features of 
anxiety, and specifically the many overlapping features of shame with social anxiety, described 
previously.  
 
Is there a threat bias in anxiety? 
There is robust evidence demonstrating an initial attentional vigilance to threat-related 
information in anxiety using the dot probe paradigm (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg et 
al., 1995; Bradley et al., 2000; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Wald, et al., 2013). Bar-Haim et al. (2007) 
showed significant although modest within-subject effects across 35 dot probe studies, 
indicating an increased bias to threatening stimuli compared to neutral stimuli among anxious 
participants. Findings also reflected a significant and comparable combined between-group 
effect size, reflecting increased bias to threatening stimuli in anxious groups compared to 
control groups. Moreover, researchers have begun examining enhanced engagement and 
deficient disengagement in dot probe paradigms. Evidence has been mounting that individuals 
with greater anxiety display greater difficulty disengaging from emotional stimuli (Fox, Russo, 
Dutton, 2002; Koster er al., 2004; Klumpp and Amir, 2009; Matlow, Gard, and Berg, 2012). 
Researchers suggests that difficulty disengaging from emotional stimuli may reflect difficulty 
shifting one’s attention to active coping or fear-disconfirming information, or may be due to 
difficulty in decision-making and may reflect an inhibited behavioral response.  Koster et al. 
(2004) proposed that maintained focus on threatening stimuli likely maintains the state of 
anxiety, and thus, difficulty disengaging may play a significant role in the maintenance of anxiety 
disorders. 
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Does the threat bias vary as a function of sample type? 
Evidence indicates the presence of attentional biases in clinically anxious samples 
(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg, et al., 1995, Wald et al., 2013) including PTSD, 
generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), social anxiety disorder (SAD), and phobias.  Additionally, 
significant attentional biases have been demonstrated in nonclinical samples with high self-
reported anxiety (Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987; Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; Bradley 
et al., 2000; Pishyar et al., 2004).  Bar-Haim et al. (2007) examined whether attentional biases 
differ between individuals with high levels of self-reported anxiety (nonclinically anxious) and 
individuals who were diagnosed with an anxiety disorder (clinically anxious) across a number of 
studies. Importantly, there was no difference in the magnitude of threat biases in 16 studies 
utilizing clinical samples compared to 19 studies using nonclinical anxiety samples. Studies 
using either type of sample produced significant, modest effect sizes. This suggests that 
nonclinical forms of anxiety are sufficient to produce attention biases.  
Another factor regarding samples that should be noted is the different control groups 
employed in different studies. Studies using a clinical sample typically recruited individuals from 
the general population, whereby these control groups demonstrated average levels of anxiety. 
Studies using nonclinically anxious individuals typically recruited a control group made up of low 
self-reported anxiety. Interestingly, Bar-Haim (2007) found that the control groups of high self-
report anxiety studies demonstrated significant threat avoidance, a pattern not found in control 
groups in studies using clinically anxious participants. This suggests that a bias away from 
negative stimuli may act as a buffer against anxiety.  
Do attentional biases show a vigilant-avoidant pattern? 
Mogg, Philippot, and Bradley (2004) introduced the term vigilant-avoidant to describe 
how the initial attention vigilance to threat seen in anxiety may be quickly followed by attentional 
avoidance of threat.  Some research corroborates this idea, although the findings on this pattern 
are more inconsistent than the findings demonstrating initial threat vigilance. 
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Mogg et al. (1995) found that there was no difference in the effect sizes when stimuli 
were presented subliminally or supraliminally.  GAD participants showed significantly more 
threat vigilance to emotional stimuli presented both subliminally and supraliminally compared to 
controls. These data indicate that attention bias to emotional stimuli did not depend on 
awareness of stimuli, as measured by a subliminal masking procedure1 to assess preconscious 
processing.  
Wald et al. (2013) found that the soldiers experiencing acute stress (a combat simulation 
group) showed more threat avoidance. Wald et al. (2013) compared soldiers’ attention biases 
following advanced combat training to a control group with no stress exposure. Furthermore, 
their findings indicated that among soldiers who were acutely stressed, those who displayed 
attention threat avoidance exhibited more PTSD symptoms. Therefore, evidence of the vigilant-
avoidant pattern of attention bias in PTSD may be more pronounced following acute emotional 
distress, such as combat or a mood-induction scenario. In summary, vigilant-avoidant threat 
processing models suggest that in anxious individuals there may be an initial, automatic 
vigilance toward a threat cue followed by avoidance of the threat cue when prolonged attention 
is required, such as supraliminal processing.  
Does tracking eye-movements help assess threat avoidance? 
Some researchers have hypothesized that supplementing the dot probe task with eye-
tracking could provide further information into patterns of vigilance and avoidance (Schofield, 
Inhoff, & Coles, 2013; Bradley et al., 2000).  Eye-tracking allows measurement of covert 
attention at smaller increments of time compared to the dot probe. A study using the dot probe 
task did not find evidence of a bias to threatening faces in a sample of GAD individuals, but did 
find evidence of this bias using eye-tracking (Mogg et al., 2000). However, this experiment 
                                                          
1
 In subliminal conditions, the word-pair is typically replaced by a mask, a string of random letters (e.g. HRSKOTW), 
usually matched for the length of the preceding word. The SOA between word-pair and mask is brief (e.g. 14 ms). 
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presented dot probe stimuli for 1000ms, which may have allowed participants enough time to 
orient towards and subsequently avoid the threatening stimuli.  
Conversely, another study provided evidence that response times measured from stimuli 
presented for 500ms in the dot probe task (covert attention) was a sufficient and valid measure 
of initial attention bias (Bradley et al., 2000).  Bradley et al. (2000) reported that eye movements 
(overt attention) did not provide further evidence of biases due to the limited eye movements 
that participants made. Therefore, the necessity of adding eye-movement data to response time 
data is unresolved, but it seems that the majority of research finds attentional biases in dot 
probe tasks alone.  
 
Explanation for Mixed Findings. Inconsistencies in these findings underscore the many 
methodological and population variants in the attentional bias research (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
In terms of methodological differences, even among studies utilizing the dot probe, different 
experimenters modify the dot probe in different ways, such as variability in number of trials and 
procedural instructions (e.g., “look at top picture” vs. “look at central fixation cross”). In terms of 
population variants among attentional bias research, some studies involve clinical samples 
(participants with diagnosed anxiety disorders) and others involve nonclinical samples (those 
who score high on measures of anxiety). Also, studies using high self-reported anxiety typically 
refer to trait anxiety, but also seldomly refers to state anxiety (either through mood induction or 
naturally occurring stress differences). Findings from the meta-analysis revealed that within-
group comparisons indicated a slightly larger effect size for studies that relied on state anxiety 
compared to trait anxiety, although this difference was not statistically significant. Between-
group comparisons, however, showed significant effect sizes only for studies that relied on trait 
anxiety but not for studies that relied on state anxiety.  
Further, Schofield, Inhoff, and Coles (2013) suggest that the dot probe is not an 
adequate measure of avoidance because at the time of attentional shift to the probe, the 
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emotional stimuli are absent. They posit that the dot probe instead measures avoidance of 
“where there had been an emotional stimulus”, but they do not provide an alternative means of 
measuring attentional bias other than supplementing the dot probe with eye-tracking. Perhaps 
this feature of the dot probe could account for the inconsistencies in the literature regarding the 
pattern of attention following initial vigilance.  
Importantly, control groups also differ across studies (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Studies 
utilizing clinical samples often recruit their control group from the general population whereas 
studies utilizing nonclinical samples recruit a control group with lower levels of anxiety. 
Furthermore, studies differ in the degree to which they rule out comorbid depression. However, 
Bar Haim et al. (2007) found no differences in effect sizes between studies that excluded 
comorbid mood disorders and studies that did not. This suggests that the existence of anxiety 
disorders with comorbid mood disorders does not change the effect size of the attentional bias. 
However, the number of studies that ruled out comorbid depression was low, possibly 
underpowering this analysis.  
These varied procedures and findings highlight the necessity of carefully choosing 
stimuli and samples. Despite these methodological variations, studies using the dot probe 
paradigm have provided compelling evidence of the presence of a threat bias in anxiety.   
 
Attentional Biases in Social Anxiety. A review of the literature on attentional biases in 
social anxiety, a construct theoretically relevant to shame, may provide further insight into 
potential attention biases in shame. Research into attentional biases in those with social anxiety 
is particularly relevant for developing predictions regarding attentional biases in those with 
shameful affect.  
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Does the threat bias vary as a function of sample type in social anxiety? 
Many studies indicate there is an attentional bias toward threatening stimuli in those who 
are socially anxious (Gotlib et al, 2004; Chen et al., 2004). Of importance, empirical evidence 
indicates that the magnitude of the threat-related bias does not differ as a function of anxiety 
disorder (GAD, panic, social anxiety disorder, PTSD, OCD, or simple phobia) (Bar-Haim, et al., 
2007). However, a nuanced analysis of social anxiety research on attentional biases studies 
sheds light in the research methodology common to this particular topic.  
Just as in anxiety, an attentional bias to threat has been detected in clinical (Mogg et al., 
2004) and nonclinical (Helfinstein, et al., 2008; Klumpp & Amir, 2009; Pishyar et al., 2004) 
socially anxious samples. One exception is a study by Bradley et al. (1997) investigating 
nonclinical socially anxious participants. They found a main effect for face valence, indicating 
that in general participants avoided threatening faces more than happy faces. However, this did 
not interact with their between-group variable, high vs. low anxiety, indicating that the high 
socially anxious group was not significantly different in terms of attentional biases compared to 
the low socially anxious group. Additionally, there was no evidence of differential attentional 
biases as a function of gender.  The study included well-validated measures and a thorough 
rating procedure for inclusion of face pictures. . Although some studies using a nonclinical 
socially anxious sample have detected attentional biases, this study was limited by including 
participants with only mild social anxiety in the high social anxiety group. It is possible that an 
attentional bias toward threat is only seen with relatively high levels of anxiety.   
Do attentional biases show a vigilant-avoidant pattern in social anxiety? 
Evidence regarding the time-course of processing in social anxiety shows there may be 
a pattern of vigilance-avoidance, as seen in studies examining anxiety in general. Mogg et al. 
(2004) showed increased threat bias to angry faces in their SAD group compared to the control 
group when the SOA was 500 ms, but not when the SOA was longer at 1250 ms.  
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Schofield et al. (2013) examined the time-course of attentional biases in SAD 
participants with the dot probe in concurrence with eye-tracking.  Eye-tracking indices indicated 
that socially anxious participants attended less to emotional faces, specifically happy faces, over 
time. Interestingly, attentional allocation among the socially anxious participants did not vary as 
a function of emotional valence. That is, there were no differences between the biases for 
happy, angry, and fearful faces, contrary to hypotheses that socially anxious participants would 
show an initial bias only to negative faces. Also surprising, they found no difference in attention 
vigilance in SAD participants compared to controls. Furthermore, their dot probe data did not 
reach significance, and they found only limited correlation between dot probe reaction times and 
eye-tracking indices. One notable reason for this deviation from prior research may be the long 
stimulus exposure times (1500 ms) employed on their dot probe (Schofield et al., 2013). This is 
potentially problematic due to prior literature demonstrating attentional avoidance at longer 
stimulus exposure times. Because participants had longer to disengage from stimuli, this could 
explain the null findings of equal attentional biases in the SAD group compared to the control 
group (Mogg et al., 2004).  
It should be noted that control participants showed an increasing tendency over time (at 
1000 ms) to attend to happy faces and avoid negative faces. This study brings to light the value 
of assessing biases to negative and positive stimuli. These authors conclude that the pattern of 
attentional allocation seen in socially anxious individuals may consist of a relative lack of biases 
compared to individuals without social anxiety. In other words, between-group effects may be 
driven by attention patterns in the non-anxious participants, and anxious individuals’ attention 
patterns may be best characterized as a lack of positive bias. Some limitations of this study 
include small sample size and failure to exclude comorbid depression. In addition, they note that 
eye-tracking measures overt attention, and that attention can shift without eye movement 
(covert attention). Furthermore, covert attention precedes overt attention, thus eye-tracking may 
not provide a full picture of attention patterns.   
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Does type of stimulus change the pattern of attentional biases in social anxiety? 
One study investigated the impact of faces compared to words on attentional biases in 
social anxiety (Pishyar et al., 2004). When facial stimuli were presented, those with high self-
reported social anxiety showed a bias towards negative faces; the control group showed a bias 
towards positive faces. Notably, neither group showed a significant bias for word stimuli. Both 
words and faces were presented for 500 ms.  This raises the possibility that longer processing 
time is needed for attentional biases to be detected when using words. Therefore, there is some 
evidence that facial stimuli may be optimal in assessing threat bias in socially anxious 
individuals.  
 
Attentional Biases in Depression 
Early theorists described information processing biases in anxiety as predominantly 
attending to threat in order to avoid future failures (attention bias) whereas depression involved 
a ruminative focus on past failures (memory bias). Indeed, findings revealed that those with 
depression show an explicit memory bias, and early studies seemed to corroborate the 
hypothesis that no attentional biases occurred in depression (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; 
Dalgeish & Watts, 1990). However, there are some potential methodological limitations in the 
early studies that could explain the null findings in depression. First, MacLeod, Mathews, and 
Tata (1986) did not appropriately match the anxiety group (younger participants on average, 
out-patients) to the depressive group (older participants on average, in-patients). Second, early 
studies failed to use depression-relevant stimuli (Mogg et al., 1995). Third, Mogg et al. (1995) 
suggested that these early studies did not focus on clinically depressed participants. Lastly, the 
probes on early versions of the dot probe did not occur on every trial. Further, the probes 
appeared more on trials containing threat words. Thus, early dot probes may have a 
confounding learning variable.  
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What is the pattern of attentional biases in depression? 
Currently, although there is limited research on attentional biases in depression, there is 
increasing evidence indicating an attention bias may exist in depression (Mathews & MacLeod, 
1994; Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1996; Peckham, 2010).  For instance, Mathews & 
MacLeod (1994) found that depressed individuals showed greater attention bias to socially 
threatening information than the anxious group. Alternately, the anxious group displayed greater 
vigilance to physically-threatening stimuli as compared to the depressed group. However, 
similar to the Mogg et al. (1995) study, Mathews & MacLeod (1994) did not rule out the 
presence of co-morbid anxiety disorders in their depressed groups. Thus, a potential alternative 
explanation of the results could be that the anxiety component could be driving the attentional 
vigilance patterns found in those who were depressed.  
Of importance, biases have been demonstrated using dysphoric stimuli in depressed 
individuals when the stimuli are presented at later stages of processing (i.e. supraliminally). 
Gotlib et al. (2004) found this pattern using carefully diagnosed individuals with Major 
Depressive Disorder.  Mogg et al. (1995) demonstrated that anxious and depressed participants 
showed supraliminal bias to negative words; subliminally only anxious individuals showed this 
pattern.  
Thus, evidence shows that depression-related attentional biases are more pronounced 
when negative stimuli are presented at longer durations, thus allowing for more elaborative 
processing, according to Mogg and Bradley (2005). Such differences from anxiety-related 
attention biases indicate that there could be different cognitive biases at play for anxiety and 
depression. Biases in depression are thought to reflect difficulty disengaging from negative 
stimuli. The existence of a supraliminal bias in depression may indicate that more elaborative 
processing needs to occur in order to detect biases in attention (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Mogg 
et al. (1995) found supraliminal attention biases for negative words (both anxiety- and 
 25 
 
depression-relevant) in those who had a primary diagnosis of major depressive disorder 
(according to DSM-III-R) compared to controls.  
The lack of consistent findings regarding biases in depression could reflect slowed 
response times due to psychomotor retardation (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Also, null findings in 
response to external threat cues may indicate that depressed individuals are more preoccupied 
with internal rumination. However, generally speaking, anxiety tends to show more attentional 
vigilance at earlier processing stages, whereas depression shows difficulty disengaging 
attention from sad stimuli at somewhat later stages (Peckham, 2010).   
In summary, threat-related attention biases include selective attention towards and away 
from threatening stimuli (Wald, et al., 2013). Generally, anxious individuals engage in an initial 
attention bias towards the threatening stimuli, but may ultimately avoid the stimuli from further 
processing. Evidence shows that depressed individuals may have an attention bias towards 
negative stimuli at later stages of processing. Understanding the role of attention vigilance, 
avoidance, engagement and disengagement in shame may help disentangle different 
components of selective attention within the information processing chain. 
Notably, the current study is one of only a few studies that utilized multiple control 
groups within the same dot probe by displaying the critical affect of disgust and additionally 
displaying sad and happy faces, thus allowing us to evaluate the effects of general negative 
affect and positive affect on our reaction times. Our dot probe is also unique in that it evaluated 
the time course of attentional biases by utilizing multiple stimulus duration times.  Thus, the 
current study provides unique contributions to the growing body of literature on information 
processing in negative affect. 
 
Specific Aims 
Given the considerations discussed above, the first primary aim of the current study was 
to determine whether there is an attentional bias in shame. The second primary aim was to 
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determine the time course of such biases by varying the duration of exposure of faces. Based 
on current trends in the literature, we utilized the dot probe paradigm to accomplish these aims. 
We compared dot probe performance of participants with low, moderate, and high levels of 
shame at varying stimuli exposure durations. We predicted patterns similar to those found in 
studies on social anxiety based on significant similarities between social anxiety and shame, 
especially the theoretical conceptualizations that include both negative evaluation from others 
and biased processing of social cues (Clark, 2005; Shahar, 2013). Specifically, we predicted 
initial (at 150 ms) attention biases to threatening stimuli in those experiencing high levels of 
shame (Hypothesis 1a) and attention biases away from threatening stimuli in those experiencing 
low levels of shame (Hypothesis 1b). In line with the majority of prior research on social anxiety, 
we also predicted attention biases away from threatening stimuli in shameful individuals and 
controls at longer stimulus exposure durations (Hypothesis 2). 
We also have one secondary aim, which was to determine whether our face stimuli 
would induce a change in affect over time.  Because participants viewed more negatively-
valenced photographs (sad and disgusted) than positively-valenced photographs (happy) we 
hypothesized that our dot probe would induce negative affect. In other words, we predicted that 
participants would report an increase in negative affect and a decline in positive affect when 
comparing their emotional state prior to the dot probe to their emotional state immediately 
following the dot probe (Hypothesis 3).  
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Research Design Overview 
The specific aims of the current study were evaluated by comparing dot probe 
performance between those with varying levels of shame.  The current study focused on women 
due to higher average levels of shame among women compared to men (Feiring, Taska, and 
Lewis, 1996). Our recruitment procedure involved online screening with the ESS.  Based on the 
range and distribution of scores obtained in prior thesis research (Grout, 2014 unpublished 
data), our original plan was to draw equally from the bottom (ESS score < 37), middle (ESS 
score between 38 and 54, inclusive), and top (ESS > 55) thirds of the prior Experiences of 
Shame Scale (ESS) scores.  A differential percentage of invitations were made to potential 
participants based on ESS scores that could be flexibly adjusted to insure parallel recruitment of 
similar numbers of participants in each of the three ESS groups.  We anticipated that there 
would be fewer participants with extreme high or low scores, compared with moderate scores.  
Accordingly, we initially invited 100% of participants with low and high scores, and a random 
60% of participants with moderate scores.  From time to time, the percentages being invited 
from each group were adjusted to slow down the flow of one or more groups.   
Unfortunately, the recruitment procedure did not yield the expected distribution of ESS 
scores, a significant plurality (48.8%) of those who attended session had scores falling in the 
high shame category, and only a small minority of participants had scores falling in the low 
shame category (12.8%).  As a result, we shifted our grouping strategy to create three groups 
based on ESS scores obtained during the in-person study session, comparing the bottom, 
middle, and top thirds of the distribution of ESS scores.  The revised low shame group included 
scores of 43 and below, the revised moderate shame group included scores between 44 and 
62, inclusive, and the revised high shame group would include scores of 63 and above.  
The study design overview is illustrated in Figure 1. Eligible participants were invited to 
attend the session and provided with a code to sign up for a timeslot for the in-person study 
session. Upon arrival to session, all participants completed informed consent, a demographics 
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questionnaire (see Appendix A), self-report questionnaires (see Appendix B-G), and the dot 
probe task.  We counterbalanced the order in which participants completed the questionnaires 
and the dot probe attention task. All participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS) before, during, and after the dot probe as a manipulation check.  Participants 
where then divided into three groups based on the ESS scores obtained during the in-person 
session.  Group assignment was based on participants falling within the top, middle, or bottom 
thirds of the ESS distribution and group assignment was completed prior to analyzing data from 
the dot probe task.    
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Figure 1.  Study Design Overview 
 
1 The order of administration of the questionnaires and the dot probe task was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
2 The PANAS was also administered during the break within the dot probe task. 
3 The Experience of Shame Scale was used post hoc to divide participants among the three 
groups.  
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High Shame 
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Dot probe design overview.  The current study evaluated attention biases in shameful 
affect using pictorial stimuli based on a few considerations. First, comparable results were found 
in dot probe studies using word stimuli compared to pictorial stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
Second, theorists argue that showing pictorial stimuli bypasses semantic processing that 
showing words would require (Pishyar et al., 2004). Third, utilizing pictorial stimuli bypasses the 
confounding variable of differences in word familiarity (Bradley, 1997).   
Due to the fact that some research suggests that attentional bias may be different for 
short vs. long durations of critical stimuli, short, medium, and long exposure times were utilized 
in order to capture the time course of attentional biases in shame.  Specifically, our dot probe 
presented stimuli for 150 ms, 500 ms, and 1000 ms.  Each face was displayed at each exposure 
length. 
Based on the premise that we sought to measure biases in participants experiencing 
shame, we suggested that the critical face stimuli be chosen based on its shame-inducing 
potential. We hypothesized that presenting faces portraying shame may not have an adequate 
“contagion-effect” of inducing shame in the participant.  By contrast, we hypothesized that faces 
expressing disgust would be more effective in inducing shame, particularly among those prone 
to feeling shame.  Thus, faces portraying disgust served as the critical stimuli in the dot probe 
task.   Furthermore, in order to investigate domain-specificity of shame, faces displaying 
alternate affect were also included in the dot probe. In order to rule out the impact of general 
negative affect, we presented sad faces.  In order to rule out the impact of any valenced affect, 
we presented happy faces.  Presenting happy faces could also help rule out if shameful 
individuals’ attention patterns are characterized by a lack of positive bias compared to controls.  
Therefore, our valenced stimuli included faces displaying disgust, sadness, and happiness. 
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Methods 
Recruitment and Screening 
Participants were recruited from a population of undergraduate women taking 
psychology classes at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Exclusion criteria for our study 
will be: (1) identification as male and (2) less than 18 years of age or more than 60.  Potential 
participants were screened for eligibility using a screener questionnaire in SONA, the university 
web-portal for research participation. We used the Experience of Shame Scale (ESS; described 
below) as the shame screener in the attempt recruit equivalently for a priori determined low, 
moderate, and high levels of shame. No data was retained from the screener.  As noted 
previously, our initial recruitment and screening plan failed to produce the desired distribution of 
ESS scores, with individuals scoring at or above 55 being over represented and those scoring at 
or below 37 being seriously underrepresented.  As a result, we subsequently adopted a post 
hoc grouping strategy based on dividing participants into groups based on the bottom, middle, 
and top thirds of ESS scores obtained during the in-person study session.   
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Figure 2.  Participant Flow 
  
Completed Screener 
(n = 329) 
Screening 
Missing data 
(n = 2) 
Included in analyses 
(n = 125) 
 
 
Low Shame 
(n = 42) 
 
Attended in-person session 
(n = 127) 
 
Moderate 
Shame 
(n = 41) 
 
High Shame 
(n = 42) 
 
 33 
 
The flow of participants from screening through final grouping is illustrated in Figure 2.  A 
total of 381 participants opened the screener, of which 329 (86.4%) completed it.  Based on the 
original a priori grouping criteria, based on the SONA screening procedure, 100% of those who 
were identified as low shame were invited to participate. Of those who were identified as 
experiencing moderate shame, 60% were initially invited, but this was decreased to 30% in 
order to increase the proportion of participants in the low category.  Of those who were identified 
in the screener as high shame, 100% were initially invited but this was decreased to 5% in order 
to reduce the proportion of high shame participants.  Of the individuals invited to participate in 
the study, 127 actually participated in the in-person study session.  Due to a procedural error, 
we do not have ESS scores on two participants.  Accordingly, the final sample comprised 125 
participants who were then categorized into low (ESS scores < 43, n = 42), moderate (ESS 
scores between 44 – 62, inclusive; n = 41), and high (ESS scores > 63, n = 42) shame 
categories, based on their ESS scores obtained in during the in-person session.  The majority of 
participants were white (76.8%), non-Hispanic (92%), and had mean age of 22.1 (ranging 
between 18 and 50, SD = 4.3). A χ² was conducted to examine shame group by racial status 
(i.e. white vs. non-white). No significant relationship was found (χ²(2) = .718, p > .05).  Table 1 
presents participant age and baseline scores for psychopathology measures. 
Power Analysis 
A power analysis was conducted utilizing G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007). With a minimum of 40 participants per group, and assuming a two-tailed t-test 
independent samples with α = 0.05, we have 80% power to detect an effect size of d > .64.  
Power to detect an effect size of d = .50 is 64%.      
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Table 1.  Baseline Scores and ANOVA Summary. 
  Shame Category   
Variable Overall Low Mod. High F (df), p t(df), p 
Age 22.1(4.3) 22.3(5.1) 21.6(3.1) 22.2(4.4) .38 (2,124), .69  
ESS 54.9(17.0) 36.5(5.3) 53.7(5.3) 74.4(9.0) 330.16 (2,122), .000*** Low vs. Mod.: -14.7 (81), .000*** 
Low vs. High: -23.6 (82), .000*** 
Med. vs. High: -12.7 (81), .000*** 
ESS-Character. 24.1(8.3) 15.9(2.9) 22.9(3.3) 33.3(5.6) 189.04 (2,122), .000*** Low vs. Mod.: -10.3 (81), .000*** 
Low vs. High: -17.8 (82), .000*** 
Med. vs. High: -10.2 (81), .000*** 
ESS-Behav. 20.6(7.0) 13.6(3.3) 20.1(2.8) 28.0(4.7) 162.4 (2,122), .000*** Low vs. Mod.: -9.8 (81), .000*** 
Low vs. High: -16.4 (82), .000*** 
Med. vs. High: -9.3 (81), .000*** 
ESS-Bodily 10.2(3.5) 7.0(2.1) 10.7(2.6) 13.0(2.7) 61.5 (2,122), .000*** Low vs. Mod.: -6.9 (81), .000*** 
Low vs. High: -11.3 (82), .000*** 
Med. vs. High: -4.1 (81), .000*** 
TOSCA-Shame 46.2(11.4) 37.7(9.6) 46.3(8.5) 54.5(9.0) 36.14(2,122), .000*** Low vs. Mod.: -4.3 (81), .000*** 
Low vs. High: -8.3 (82), .000*** 
Med. vs. High: -4.2 (81), .000*** 
TOSCA-Guilt 64.7(8.0) 64.2(6.1) 62.4(10.1) 67.4(6.6) 4.39(2,122), .01* Low vs. Mod.: 1.0 (81), .34 
Low vs. High: -2.3 (82), .02* 
Med. vs. High: -2.7 (81), .009** 
TOSCA-Pride 19.1(3.8) 19.8(3.6) 18.6(4.4) 19.1(3.6) 1.05(2,122), .35  
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DASS-
Depression 
10.2(9.3) 4.8(5.5) 9.7(8.1) 16.2(9.9) 21.14(2,122), .000*** Low vs. Mod.: -3.2 (81), .000*** 
Low vs. High: -6.5 (82), .000*** 
Med. vs. High: -3.3 (81), .002** 
DASS-Anxiety 8.8(8.9) 3.7(4.0) 8.6(7.2) 14.2(10.8) 18.78(2,122), .000*** Low vs. Mod.: -3.8 (81), .000*** 
Low vs. High: -5.9 (82), .000*** 
Med. vs. High: -2.8 (81), .007** 
DASS-Stress 16.4(9.8) 9.4(6.9) 16.3(6.9) 23.5(9.6) 33.37(2,122), .000*** Low vs. Mod.: -4.6 (81), .000*** 
Low vs. High: -7.7 (82), .000*** 
Med. vs. High: -3.9 (81), .000*** 
STAI-State 40.8(10.3) 35.2(8.8) 40.5(8.6) 46.8(10.1) 16.62(2,122), .000*** Low vs. Mod.: -2.8 (81), .000*** 
Low vs. High: -5.6 (82), .000*** 
Med. vs. High: -3.0 (81), .003** 
STAI-Trait 45.5(11.2) 36.1(7.2) 46.0(7.8) 54.4(9.6) 51.49(2,122), .000*** Low vs. Mod.: -6.0 (81), .000*** 
Low vs. High: -9.9 (82), .000*** 
Med. vs. High: -4.4 (81), .000*** 
SPIN 19.8(14.3) 8.4(6.5) 18.4(11.1) 32.4(12.6) 56.43(2,122), .000*** Low vs. Mod.: -5.0 (81), .000*** 
Low vs. High: -11.0 (82), .000*** 
Med. vs. High: -5.4 (81), .000*** 
Note. For the mean columns, standard deviations are in parentheses. * p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001 
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Materials 
Experience of Shame Scale (ESS; Andrews, Qian, & Valentine, 2002; see 
Appendix B). The ESS is a 25- item questionnaire that assesses proneness to 
experience shame with a global shame score and on three dimensions: 
characterological shame, behavioral shame, and bodily shame.  This instrument shows 
strong psychometric properties.  
Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3; Tangney, Wanger, & Gramzow, 1989; 
see Appendix C). The TOSCA-3 provides 16 scenarios and measures shame along the 
dimensions of shame, guilt, pride, externalization, and detachment. This instrument 
demonstrates good validity and reliability. 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; 
see Appendix D). The DASS-21 is the short form of the 42-item DASS. The DASS-21 
measures constructs of Anxiety, Depression, and Stress using a four-point scale ranging 
from ‘Does not apply to me at all’ to ‘Applied to me very much, or most of the time.’  
Higher scores indicate greater symptom severity. The DASS-21 shows strong 
psychometric properties  
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 1970; see 
Appendix E). The STAI is a 40-item questionnaire that assesses state (temporary) and 
trait (stable) anxiety on a 4-point Likert scale. This instrument shows strong 
psychometric properties and has been used extensively in research.  
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000; see Appendix F). The SPIN 
is a 17-item self-report questionnaire that utilizes a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (Not at all) 
to 4 (Extremely). Participants are asked to rate how much each statement applies to 
them. The SPIN has demonstrated good reliability and validity.  
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Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, et al., 1988; see Appendix 
G).  The PANAS is a 20-item self-report measure that evaluates current positive (e.g., 
excited, proud, active, enthusiastic) and negative (e.g., ashamed, scared, irritable, 
nervous) emotional experiences (Watson, et al., 1988).  Participants will be asked to rate 
20 emotional states (10 positive; 10 negative) on a 5 point scale (1 = slightly or not at all; 
5 = extreme) based on how they feel at the time of completion. Scores yield a positive 
affect score and a negative affect score. The PANAS has demonstrated adequate 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability.  
 Dot Probe Task.  The dot probe task was developed for use on laptop computers 
using E-Prime software and was based on the original visual dot probe task developed 
by MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986).  E-Prime reports millisecond accuracy of 
reaction times. The laptop was placed on a stand, yielding an approximate downward 
visual angle of 10⁰. A keyboard attached to the computer was placed on the desk at the 
level of participant’s forearms for ease of responding. Participants were seated 
approximately 50 cm from the screen. All participants completed two practice trials with 
no facial stimuli, in which they simply indicated the number of probes that appeared. The 
remaining trials are considered critical trials, which presented a standardized set of black 
and white photographs of actors and actresses portraying facial expressions (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1976).  The current study utilized three types of valenced emotional faces, 
characterized as disgusted (D), sad (S), and happy (H).  Each valenced face was paired 
with one neutral (N) face of the same actor or actress.  Utilizing the same actor or 
actress allowed us to match each photograph pair with respect to race, gender, age, 
attractiveness, etc.  There were 10 photograph pairs for each affect (D-N, S-N, H-N). 
Half of the photographs pairs were males; half were females. All photographs measured 
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5.5 cm in width and 8 cm in height. There was 11 cm from the center of one photograph 
to the center of the other.  
Additionally, three N-N face pairs were presented at each of the three durations. 
These three face pairs were novel faces not included in the valenced trials. Each neutral 
face was paired with the same neutral face. N-N trials were used to measure attentional 
engagement and disengagement by comparing attentional biases scores to these 
baseline N-N trials (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Houwer, 2004). The D-N, S-N, H-N, 
and N-N will be combined and presented in a random order to each participant.   
Each probe detection trial began with a fixation cross at the center of the screen 
displayed for 500 ms (see Figure 3).  In the critical trials, the cross was replaced by a 
face pair, displayed for one of three durations: 150ms, 500 ms, or 1000 ms.  Immediately 
following the offset up the photographs, a probe (one or two “ ”) appeared in the 
location of one of the faces.  The probe remained on the screen until the participant 
made a response.  Participants were instructed to indicate the type of probe that 
appeared by making a key press (i.e. “1” or “2”) with the fingers of their (usually right) 
hand.    
We counterbalanced valenced-face location (valenced face on top or bottom), 
the probe type (1 or 2 dots), and probe location (top or bottom).  Thus, the valenced 
faces appeared an equivalent number of times in the top and bottom positions with the 
neutral face appearing in the other position.  Additionally, the probe appeared an  
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Figure 3.  Sequence of events in an incongruent dot probe trial with a valenced 
face pair 
 
 
equivalent number of times in the top and bottom positions, and replaced the valenced 
face as often as a neutral face. Due to counterbalancing a high number of variables, 
each of the D-N, S-N, H-N, and N-N pairs were presented twelve times, resulting in a 
total of 398 trials (120 trials for each affect + 36 neutral-neutral trials + 2 practice trials). 
Participants were given a break to rest their eyes following the 199th trial. During the 
break, participants completed the PANAS. 
Scoring.  Three attention biases indices were calculated for each participant, 
including the conventional attention bias index (AB), the facilitated engagement index 
(FE), and the difficulty disengaging index (DD; Koster et al., 2004; see Table 2).  The AB 
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index for each participant was calculated by taking the mean response time of trials in 
which the probe appeared at the location of the neutral face (incongruent trial reaction 
times) and subtracting the mean response time of trials in which the probe appeared at 
the location of the valenced face (congruent trial reaction times). Positive scores indicate 
a bias towards the emotional face, with faster reaction times on congruent trials than 
incongruent trials (vigilance). In terms of the disgust trials, positive scores indicate an 
attentional bias towards threatening information, or threat vigilance.  On these trials, 
negative scores indicate an attentional bias away from threat (i.e. threat avoidance).   
To calculate the FE and DD indices, we included N-N trials as suggested by 
Koster et al (2004). The N-N trials function as a baseline measure in that there is no 
affective information to shift participants’ attention. Comparing trials that contain affective 
information to trials with neutral-only information allows us to evaluate components of 
visual attention, such as enhanced engagement or difficulty disengaging, which we 
cannot do using the conventional bias index.  For the FE index we took the mean 
reaction times for N-N trials and subtracted the mean reaction times of congruent trials. 
When participants were faster to respond to congruent trials compared to neutral trials, 
(positive FE scores), this reflects facilitated engagement to the valenced faces. Negative 
scores indicated slowed engagement to the valenced face pairs compared to neutral 
face pairs. For the DD index, we took the mean reaction times of incongruent trials and 
subtracted the mean reaction times for N-N trials. Positive scores reflect difficulty 
disengaging, indicating that the participant was faster to respond to the N-N baseline 
trials than the incongruent trials. Negative scores reflect eased disengagement, 
indicating that participants had no difficulty disengaging.  
  
  
41 
 
Table 2.  Calculation and Interpretation of Indices of Attention Bias. 
Attention Index 
Conventional Attention 
Bias (AB) 
Facilitated 
Engagement (FE) 
Difficulty  
Disengaging (DD) 
Formula AB = IRT - CRT FE = NRT - CRT DD = IRT - NRT 
Interpretation of 
positive scores 
+ AB = Vigilance for 
emotional faces 
+FE = Facilitated 
engagement for 
emotional 
+ DD = Difficulty 
disengaging from 
emotional faces 
(faster to respond on 
congruent trials than 
incongruent trials) 
(faster to respond on 
congruent trials than 
neutral trials) 
(faster to respond on 
neutral trials than 
incongruent trials) 
Interpretation of 
negative scores 
-AB = Avoidance of 
emotional faces 
-FE = Slowed 
engagement to 
emotional faces 
-DD = Eased 
disengagement from 
emotional faces 
(slower to respond on 
congruent trials than 
incongruent trials) 
(slower to respond on 
congruent trials than 
neutral trials) 
(slower to respond on 
neutral trials than 
incongruent trials) 
Note.  IRT = mean reaction time on incongruent trials; CRT = mean reaction time on 
congruent trials; and NRT = mean reaction time on neutral trials. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were screened prior to arrival to the lab to determine their level of 
shame. Prescreening data was not retained. Eligible participants were provided with a 
code that allowed them to sign-up for a study timeslot. Participants were asked to attend 
one two-hour session.  Upon arrival to the laboratory, an experimenter led the participant 
into a private room and explained the informed consent document for the study. After 
written consent was obtained, the experimenter directed the participant’s attention to a 
laptop computer that was used to administer all the self-report measures and the 
attention task.  All materials were administered on a 14-inch Dell Latitude E6410 laptop 
with an Intel Core i7 processor. Approximately half of the participants then completed the 
demographic questionnaires and self-report measures first, followed by the attention 
task; the remaining participants completed the attention task first, followed by the 
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demographics questionnaires and self-report measures.  The order with which 
participants completed these tasks was determined by a random number generator, and 
was recorded for analyses. For all participants, the PANAS was administered three 
times: before, during (at the break), and after the attention task in order to evaluate any 
changes in positive and negative affect.  
Demographic and self-report measures were administered using the program 
Qualtrics. The experimenter provided brief instructions for the completion of the self-
report measures. The participant completed these forms in private and informed the 
experimenter upon completion.  
For the attention task, the experimenter provided a brief introduction to the task, 
and initiated the dot probe program using E-Prime. The experimenter left the room 
during testing but was available for questions from the participant. Detailed instructions 
for responding were provided within the dot probe program, described as follows. 
Participants were instructed that their goal was to identify the number of dots as quickly 
and accurately as possible.  They were informed that a dot may appear at the top or 
bottom position of the screen and they were to press the 1 key if there was one dot and 
the 2 key if there were two dots.  Participants were instructed to keep two fingers from 
the same hand on the 1 and 2 keys.  They were given a break halfway through the trials, 
in which they were instructed to rest their eyes for one minute and complete the PANAS. 
Participants completed a total of 398 trials, and they were instructed to contact the 
experimenter upon completion.  
After the participant completed the self-report measures (including the PANAS 
before and after the attention task) and the attention task, the experimenter conducted a 
debriefing that described the purposes of the study and provided available resources for 
local mental health services. The debriefing procedure occurred for all participants who 
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have given consent to participate. All experimenters were trained by the principle 
investigators of the study. Any participant indicating she was experiencing acute distress 
upon completing the study was directed to a graduate student in clinical psychology. 
This occurred one time. Furthermore, Dr. Cahill, the faculty adviser for this study, was 
also available for providing assistance to distressed participants.  
 
Results 
All error and outlier trials were excluded from analyses. The number of errors 
made by participants ranged from 0 to 144 (M = 13.5, SD = 17.27).   Errors occurred on 
3.46% of trials.  Additionally, trials with reaction times shorter than 100 ms (considered 
an anticipation error) or longer than 1,000 ms (considered a concentration error) were 
excluded from analyses. The number of outliers per participant ranged from 0 to 111 (M 
= 8.43, SD = 16.94).  Overall there were 2.06% outlier trials.  Analyses were performed 
on the remaining data. 
Attention biases were measured by reaction times to probes following 
presentation of faces. Scoring procedures for our three attention bias indices are 
described in Materials.  We computed average reaction times of the trials that are used 
to compute each of the three bias indices (i.e., congruent, incongruent, neutral-neutral) 
by shame group at each stimulus exposure duration (e.g., 150, 500, 1000ms).  These 
means are presented in Table 3.   
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Table 3.  Mean Dot Probe Reaction Times (ms) by Trial Type and Mean Differences for Bias Scores 
  Low Shame (n = 42)  Moderate Shame (n = 41)  High Shame (n = 42) 
Affect  150 ms 500 ms 1000 ms  150 ms 500 ms 1000 ms  150 ms 500 ms 1000 ms 
Disgust Incongruent 555 (60) 552 (62) 552 (61)  536 (53) 535 (48) 533 (50)  564 (60) 570 (63) 569 (65) 
 Congruent 547 (67) 541 (68) 548 (69)  533 (51) 539 (54) 536 (48)  560 (64) 559 (69) 561 (61) 
             
Sad Incongruent 546 (61) 540 (72) 551 (67)  531 (49) 538 (50) 535 (51)  567 (57) 566 (63) 563 (57) 
 Congruent 541 (64) 553 (60) 548 (66)  530 (44) 531 (49) 532 (51)  564 (59) 565 (59) 568 (66) 
             
Happy Incongruent 550 (66) 551 (62) 549 (62)  538 (50) 534 (52) 534 (47)  562 (61) 564 (61) 562 (60) 
 Congruent 541 (67) 547 (62) 542 (59)  536 (42) 536 (48) 535 (51)  563 (59) 561 (61) 557 (64) 
             
Neutral  557 (75) 545 (64) 554 (66)  542 (52) 538 (52) 544 (57)  558 (61) 558 (72) 562 (69) 
Disgust AB Index 8 (29) 11 (38) 4 (39)  3 (30) -4 (30) -3 (28)  4 (24) 11 (26) 8 (32) 
 FE Index 10 (39) 4 (47) 6 (40)  9 (35) -1 (38) 8 (37)  -2 (30) -1 (37) 1 (37) 
 DD Index -2 (39) 7 (37) -2 (37)  -6 (37) -3 (44) -11 (32)  6 (32) 12 (30) 7 (31) 
             
Sad AB Index 5 (32) -13 (61) 3 (30)  1 (36) 7 (31) 3 (36)  3 (29) 1 (46) -5 (37) 
 FE Index 16 (41) -8 (35) 6 (39)  12 (34) 7 (46) 12 (47)  -6 (29) -7 (31) -6 (32) 
 DD Index -11 (40) -5 (31) -3 (38)    -11 (40) 0 (38) -9 (39)     9 (31) 8 (35) 1 (39) 
             
Happy AB Index 9 (33) 4 (32) 7 (31)  2 (27) -2 (32) -1 (35)  -1 (28) 3 (25) 5 (30) 
 FE Index 16 (42) -2 (40) 12 (38)  6 (36) 2 (38) 9 (42)  -5 (28) -3 (33) 5 (29) 
 DD Index -7 (49) 6 (39) -5 (35)  -4 (39) -4 (48) -10 (39)  4 (36) 6 (30) -0.3 (30) 
Note. Standard Deviations are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 4.  ANOVA Summary of Conventional Attention Bias Index 
Source of Variance F Df p 
Affect 1.24 (2,238) .29 
Duration 0.47 (2,238) .62 
Order 1.14 (1,119) .29 
Group 1.06 (2,119) .35 
Affect X  Duration 0.30 (4,476) .88 
Affect X Group 2.04 (4, 238) .09 
Affect X Order 0.80 (2,238) .45 
Duration X Group 0.70 (4,238) .60 
Duration X Order 0.14 (2,238) .87 
Group X Order 1.02 (2,119) .36 
Affect X Duration X Group 1.20 (8, 476) .30 
Affect X Duration X Order 1.60 (4,476) .17 
Affect X Order X Group 0.20 (4,238) .94 
Duration X Order X Group 2.62 (4,238) .03* 
Affect X Duration X Order X Group 0.44 (8,476) .90 
Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level. 
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For each of the three attention bias indices, we calculated separate 4-way mixed 
factorial ANOVAs to compare the effects of affect (disgust, sad, and happy), stimulus 
exposure duration (150 ms, 500 ms, and 1,000 ms), order of administration 
(questionnaires first or dot-probe first), and shame group (low, medium, or high) on bias 
scores. Order of administration and shame group served as the between-group 
variables.   
ANOVA results for the conventional bias index are summarized in Table 4.  This 
analysis yielded a significant duration X group X order interaction, F(4,238) = 2.62 , p < 
.05).  Following the strategy of Fisher’s test (Keppel & Zedick, 1989), we investigated 
simple main effects for the significant duration X group X order interaction.  More 
specifically, for each order we invested the simple main effect of duration within each 
shame group. 
The means for this interaction are presented in Figures 4a (dot probe first) and 
4b (questionnaires first).  Beginning with participants who completed the dot probe first, 
separate t-tests for repeated measures were conducted for each shame group 
comparing attentional bias for 150 ms trials with performance for 500 ms trials, 150 ms 
trials with 1,000 ms trials, and 500 ms trials with 1,000 ms trials.  The same analyses 
were then conducted for participants who completed the questionnaires first.  For 
participants who completed the dot probe first, none of the pairwise comparisons were 
significant. For those who completed the questionnaires first, our findings showed that 
duration made a difference for low shame participants. Specifically, low shame 
participants displayed an attentional bias away from the emotional faces at the 500 ms 
duration (attention avoidance; M = -8.42, SD = 23.03), which was significantly different 
from an attentional bias toward emotional faces at the 1,000 ms duration (attention 
vigilance; M = 6.59, SD = 21.05) (t(20) = -2.19, p = .04).  There was a similar trend  
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Figure 4a.  Conventional Attention Bias scores: Dot Probe First 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4b.  Conventional Attention Bias scores: Questionnaires First 
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for a difference between the attention avoidance at 500 ms and attention vigilance at 
150 ms (M = 5.82, SD = 25.86) (t(20) = 1.70, p = .11).  There was no significant 
difference between biases at the 150 ms and 1000 ms durations. 
We also evaluated the simple main effect of group at each duration for each 
order. We conducted three ANOVAs for each order to investigate the effect of group at 
150 ms, 500 ms, and 1, 000 ms. Results for participants who completed the dot probe 
first indicated a trending group main effect at the 500 ms stimulus exposure duration, 
F(2, 57) = 2.74, p = .07. For completeness, the follow-up analyses for the 500 ms 
duration using the LSD method indicated low shame individuals displayed an attentional 
bias toward emotional faces (M = 9.56, SD = 15.63), which was significantly different 
from the moderate shame individuals’ bias away from emotional faces (M = -4.08, SD = 
21.27; p = .02). There were no group main effects at the 150 ms, F(2, 57) = 2.0, p = .15, 
nor the 1,000 F(2, 57) < 1, p = .99) durations. Analyses for participants who completed 
questionnaires first also demonstrated a trending group main effect at the 500 ms 
stimulus exposure duration, F(2, 62) = 2.84, p = .07. However, follow-up analyses for the 
500 ms duration using the LSD method indicated that when questionnaires were 
administered first, low shame individuals displayed an attentional bias away emotional 
faces (M = -8.42, SD = 23.03), which was significantly different from the bias towards 
emotional faces among moderate shame individuals (M = 4.00, SD = 19.09; p = .04) and 
low shame individuals’ avoidance was significantly different from high shame individuals’ 
vigilance towards emotional faces (M = 4.35, SD = 17.05; p = .04). Moderate and high 
shame individuals were not significantly different (p = .95) at this duration and order. 
Group main effects at neither the 150 ms (p = .72) nor the 1,000 ms (p = .22) durations 
approached significance. 
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Figure 5.  Bias Scores by Group and Stimulus Valence in the AB Index 
 
In addition, there was a trend towards significance for the affect X group 
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trending main effect for group for the disgust faces, F(2, 122) = 2.86, p = .06. Follow-up 
tests using the LSD post hoc test revealed that attention vigilance in the low shame 
group (M = 7.72, SD = 22.14) was significantly different than the slight attention 
avoidance in the moderate shame group (M = -1.15, SD = 18.53; p = .04). Likewise, the 
attention vigilance observed in the high shame group (M = 7.50, SD = 16.49; p = .04) 
was significantly different than the slight attention avoidance in the moderate shame 
group. Interestingly, there was no significant difference in biases to disgust faces 
between the low and high shame group (p = .96). The simple main effect of shame 
group was not significant for either sad, F(2, 122) < 1, p = .39, or happy trials,  
F(2, 122) = 1.4, p = .25.   
ANOVA results for the analysis of the FE index are summarized in Table 5.  The 
analysis indicated a significant main effect for shame group (F(2,119) = 3.65 , p = .02).  
We utilized the LSD post hoc analysis to further investigate group differences. Results 
indicated that low shame participants oriented to affective stimuli significantly faster  
(facilitated engagement; M = 6.61, SE = 2.89) than high shame participants who showed 
slightly slowed engagement (M = -2.77, SE = 2.90; p = .02).  Similarly, facilitated 
engagement scores for moderate shame (M = 7.09, SE = 2.97) were significantly 
different than the slowed engagement scores for the high shame group (p = .02) (See 
Figure 6).   
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Table 5.  ANOVA Summary of Facilitated Engagement Index 
Source of Variance F df p 
Affect 0.26 (2,238) .77 
Duration 2.26 (2,238) .11 
Order 0.73 (1,119) .40 
Group 3.65 (2,119) .02* 
Affect X  Duration 0.90 (4,476) .50 
Affect X Group 1.95 (4,238) .10 
Affect X Order 0.29 (2,238) .75 
Duration X Group 0.64 (4,238) .64 
Duration X Order 0.36 (2,238) .70 
Group X Order 0.83 (2,119) .44 
Affect X Duration X Group 1.04 (8, 476) .41 
Affect X Duration X Order 1.79 (4,476) .13 
Affect X Order X Group 0.14 (4,238) .97 
Duration X Order X Group 1.35 (4,238) .25 
Affect X Duration X Order X Group 0.99 (8,476) .44 
Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level. 
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Figure 6.  Means of FE Scores by Group 
 
 
In addition, there was a trend toward a significant affect X group interaction, F(4, 
238) = 1.95, p = .10 (see Figure 7 for FE scores by group and stimulus valence).  We 
used repeated measures t-tests to follow up this interaction, which revealed that high 
shame participants were slower to engage with sad stimuli (M = -5.98, SD = 17.84) 
compared to both disgust stimuli (M = -.57, SD = 21.77 ) (t(41) = 2.37, p = .02) and 
happy stimuli (M = -1.13, SD = 18.37 ) (t(41) = 2.14, p = .04), and there was no 
significant difference in FE scores between happy and disgust stimuli (t(41) = 0.18, p = 
.86). For the moderate and low shame groups, there were no significant pairwise 
comparisons (all p-values > .12). To further follow up this interaction, we also 
investigated the simple main effect of shame group at each affect. The main effect for 
group was significant with sad faces F(2,122) = 5.61, p = .005. The low shame group 
showed facilitated engagement to the sad faces (M = 4.70, SD = 25.81), which was 
significantly different from the slowed engagement to sad faces in the high shame group 
(M = -6.0, SD = 17.84; p = .03) as indicated by LSD post hoc analyses.  
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Figure 7.  Bias Scores by Group and Stimulus Valence in the FE Index 
 
The facilitated engagement to the sad faces among the moderate shame group 
(M = 10.51, SD = 24.00) was also significantly different from the slowed engagement to 
sad faces in the high shame group (p = .001).  There also was a trend for an effect of 
group with happy faces, F(2, 122) = 2.36. p = .10.  We observed that low shame 
participants displayed enhanced engagement for happy faces (M = 8.46, SD = 22.27) 
compared to high shame participants' slightly slowed engagement (M =-1.13, SD = 
18.37, p = .04). There were no significant differences in engagement to happy faces 
when comparing moderate shame participants (M = 5.83, SD = 21.85) to either low 
shame participants (p = .57) or high shame participants (p = .13). There was no effect of 
group for disgust faces disgust faces, F(2, 122) = 1.28, p = .28.   
ANOVA results for the DD index are presented in Table 6.  The analysis 
indicated a significant main effect for shame group F(2,119) = 4.44 , p = .01).   
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Table 6.  ANOVA Summary of Difficulty Disengaging Index 
Source of Variance F df p 
Affect 1.87 (2,238) .16 
Duration 1.45 (2,238) .24 
Order 0.20 (1,119) .65 
Group 4.44 (2,119) .01* 
Affect X  Duration 0.32 (4,476) .86 
Affect X Group 0.59 (4, 238) .67 
Affect X Order 0.17 (2,238) .85 
Duration X Group 0.29 (4,238) .89 
Duration X Order 0.41 (2,238) .67 
Group X Order 1.07 (2,119) .35 
Affect X Duration X Group 0.70 (8, 476) .69 
Affect X Duration X Order 1.00 (4,476) .41 
Affect X Order X Group 1.08 (4,238) .37 
Duration X Order X Group 0.44 (4,238) .78 
Affect X Duration X Order X Group 1.24 (8,476) .28 
Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level. 
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Follow-up tests utilizing the LSD method indicated that the high shame group took longer 
to disengage attention from affective trials than neutral trials (difficulty disengaging;  
M = 6.1, SE = 3.11) trials compared to the moderate shame group (eased 
disengagement; M = -7.06, SE = 3.19; p = 0.004); the low shame group (M = -1.62, SE = 
3.1) did not differ significantly from the moderate (p = .21) shame group.  The high 
shame group exhibited a trend towards having greater difficulty disengaging from 
affective stimuli compared to the low shame group (p = .09) (See Figure 8).  None of the 
other main effects or interactions in our ANOVA were significant.  
We also investigated participants’ change in affect over time. We conducted two 
mixed-factorial ANOVAs to evaluate the effects of shame group and time for positive and 
negative affect (see Table 7 and Table 8, respectively). In terms of positive affect, we 
found a main effect of time F(2,240) = 53.4, p < .001). We conducted three repeated 
measures t-tests as a follow-up.  Results indicated a significant decrease in positive 
affect from Time 1 (M = 27.2, SD = 7.5) to Time 2 (M = 23.5, SD = 8.0), t(122) = 6.94, p 
< .001 (See Figure 9).  There was a further significant decrease from Time 2 to Time 3 
(M = 21.9, SD = 8.3), t(122) = 4.01, < .001. Accordingly, the overall decline from Time 1 
to Time 3 was also significant, t(123) = 8.64, < .001.   
In addition, the main effect of group was trending towards significance F(2,120) = 
3.06, p = .051). Follow up analyses using LSD indicated significantly greater positive 
affect in low shame participants (M = 26.44, SE = 1.11) compared to both moderate 
shame participants (M = 23.01, SE = 1.12; p = .03) and high shame participants (M = 
23.15, SE = 1.10; p = .04) (See Figure 10). There was no significant difference in 
positive affect between moderate and high shame groups (p = .93) . Analyses yielded no 
significant interaction between time and shame group, F(4, 240) = 1.09, p = .36).  
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Figure 8.  Means of DD Scores by Group 
 
 
 
Table 7.  ANOVA Summary of Positive Affect 
Source of Variance F df p 
Time 53.40 (2,240) .000* 
Group 3.06 (2,120) .051  
Time X Group 1.09 (4,240) .36 
Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level. 
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Figure 9.  Change in Positive Affect in Participants Overall 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Trend of Group Differences in Negative Affect 
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Table 8.  ANOVA Summary of Negative Affect 
Source of Variance F df p 
Time 11.43 (2,240) .000* 
Group 17.20 (2,120) .000*  
Time X Group 0.32 (4,240) .87 
Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level. 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Change in Negative Affect in Participants Overall 
 
  
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
N
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 P
A
N
A
S
 S
c
o
re
 
Assessment 
  
59 
 
 
Figure 12.  Group Differences in Negative Affect 
 
In terms of negative affect, we found a main effect of time F(2,240) = 11.43,  
p < .001). Our follow-up using three repeated measures t-tests indicated a significant 
decrease in negative affect from Time 1 (M =14.23, SD = 4.4) to Time 2 (M = 13.24,  
SD = 3.9) (t(122) = 3.71, p < .001), and an overall decline from Time 1 (M =14.21 ,  
SD = 4.4) to Time 3 (M = 12.92, SD = 3.9) (t(123) = 4.19, p < .001) (See Figure 11). 
There was no significant difference in negative affect from Time 2 to Time 3 (p = .24). 
The main effect of group was also significant F(2,120) = 17.2, p < .001). Follow 
up analyses using LSD indicated significantly greater negative affect in high shame 
participants (M = 15.79, SE =.50) compared to both moderate shame participants  
(M = 12.83, SE = .52; p < .001) and low shame participants (M = 11.72, SE =.51;  
p <.001) (See Figure 12). There was no significant difference in negative affect between 
low and moderate shame groups (p = .13). We found no significant interaction between 
time and shame group F(4,240) = 0.32, p = .87.  
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Discussion 
Shameful affect is associated with a range of anxiety and depressive mood 
disorders (Gilbert, 2000; Fergus et al., 2010; Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011; 
Carvalho, 2013). In addition, prior research has demonstrated biases in attention 
processing among anxious and depressed participants.  The current study sought to 
investigate components of attention processing that may be influenced by shameful 
affect.  In order to evaluate attentional biases in shame, we compared dot probe 
performance of individuals with low, moderate, and high levels of trait shame. 
Additionally, we investigated the effect of the affective valence of test stimuli and time 
course of such biases by exposing stimuli portraying disgust, sad, and happy faces at 
short (150 ms), medium (500 ms), and long (1,000 ms) durations. The order of 
administration of the dot probe and various study-related self-report questionnaires was 
counterbalanced (i.e., dot probe task followed by questionnaires; questionnaires 
followed by dot probe task) across participants.  
Consistent with prior research on shame, we found at baseline that the high 
shame group also had higher levels of guilt, depression, state and trait anxiety, social 
anxiety, and stress. The high shame group, as defined by scores on the Experience of 
Shame Scale (ESS) also had higher shame scores on the Test of Self Conscious Affect 
(TOSCA), suggesting convergent validity of these measures. Although the high group 
had higher guilt scores than both the low and moderate shame groups, the low and 
moderate shame groups did not differ from one another.  However, it should also be 
noted that there were no differences among the three shame groups on pride as 
measured by the TOSCA, suggesting that shame and pride may be unrelated constructs 
despite broad perceptions they may reflect opposite ends of the same variable.  
  
61 
 
Unexpectedly, we found evidence of an order effect in the context of a three-way 
duration X shame group X order interaction when examining the conventional attention 
bias index. When the questionnaires were administered first, we observed that the 
stimulus exposure duration impacted individuals with low amounts of shame, whereas 
duration had no effect for the other shame groups.  Averaging reaction times across 
affective trials, low shame participants showed a vigilant-avoidant-vigilant pattern, where 
they demonstrated vigilance of emotional stimuli at short and long exposure durations 
and avoidance at a mid-range exposure duration. The impact of the stimulus duration 
was absent for individuals with moderate-high levels of shame. These findings are 
contrary to our hypotheses, in which we predicted a vigilant-avoidant pattern of attention 
biases to threatening stimuli in those experiencing high shame and avoidance of 
threatening stimuli at all durations in those with low levels of shame. Notably, we found 
no effect of duration when the dot probe was administered first.  Thus, it is likely that the 
questionnaires influenced the low shame group’s performance, perhaps by altering the 
affective state of this group. It is possible that completing questionnaires first may induce 
affect or increase affective awareness in the low shame group that does not otherwise 
occur if the dot probe was completed first. In turn, this may influence where low shame 
participants allocate their attention. In other words, completing the questionnaires may 
have induced an emotional or cognitive state that then influenced how they performed 
on the dot probe.  Perhaps the dot probe first condition reflects participants’ performance 
without this additional influence.     
In addition to these findings, we observed trends for shame groups to differ at the 
500 ms duration and that the direction of that effect differed for the two administration 
orders.  Specifically, when questionnaires were administered first, the low shame group 
demonstrated avoidance of emotional faces and the moderate and high shame groups 
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demonstrated emotion vigilance.  Interestingly, when the dot probe was administered 
first, this pattern was partially reversed in that the low shame group exhibited vigilance to 
emotional faces and the moderate shame group exhibited slight avoidance of emotional 
faces at the mid-range duration. It seems that the low shame group is driving the 
differences in attentional bias patterns across each of the orders of administration, 
although the reason that order made a difference for the conventional attention bias is 
not clear. It is possible that the dot probe is vulnerable to order effects, or this could be 
reflective of a Type I error.  Moreover, it is unclear why these differences appeared only 
at the mid-range duration. Future research should be sensitive to the possibility of order 
effects in regards to the dot probe.and should administer the dot probe first in order to 
minimize  any effects that prior testing, that is not of specific theoretical interest, may 
have on dot probe performance.  Additionally, future studies utilizing the dot probe 
paradigm should continue to assess the time course of biases by exposing stimuli at 
multiple durations. It may be that the 500 ms stimulus exposure duration is important in 
capturing between-group differences for shame. 
We extended these findings by exploring the constructs of facilitated engagement 
(faster orienting toward) and difficulty disengaging (slowed shifting of attention away). 
Based on our prediction of observing a bias toward threat, we expected to observe 
facilitated engagement to disgust stimuli in high shame individuals. However, our results 
showed that individuals who reported high levels of shame were slower to engage in all 
affective stimuli compared to individuals with low or moderate levels of shame.  As a 
possible explanation for this unexpected finding, we note that shame is marked by fear 
of negative social evaluation (Clark, 2005; Leary, 2004).  Accordingly, slowed 
engagement in response to the emotional stimuli used in this study may be reflective of 
avoidance of social stimuli in particular, regardless of emotional valence. Future 
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research could investigate whether non-social, emotional stimuli influence attention 
allocation differently than social, emotional stimuli. 
Further extending our investigation of attention biases, we expected that high 
shame individuals would demonstrate difficulty disengaging from threatening stimuli. 
This prediction was partially supported in that high shame individuals experienced more 
difficulty disengaging from all affective stimuli compared to individuals with moderate 
shame, and this pattern was trending in regards to individuals with high compared to low 
shame. Thus, individuals with high levels of shame exhibited slowed engagement to- but 
delayed disengagement from all affective stimuli. The results from the facilitated 
engagement and difficulty disengaging indices indicate highly shame individuals have a 
delay in attending to affective stimuli, similar to attention avoidance, but once information 
is attended to there may be a delay in shifting attention and/or interference in making a 
response (Matlow, Gard, and Berg, 2012).  
Disengagement difficulties have been found in previous studies on anxiety (Fox, 
Russo, Dutton, 2002; Koster er al., 2004; Klumpp and Amir, 2009; Matlow, Gard, and 
Berg, 2012). Particularly surprising was our observation that delayed disengagement 
was seen for both positively and negatively valenced stimuli. We expected that 
individuals experiencing high levels of shame would be particularly concerned with 
shame-inducing stimuli (i.e. disgust faces). However, high shame individuals 
demonstrated increased dwell-time to all stimuli regardless of valence. Researchers 
suggest that deficiencies in disengaging are particularly problematic in anxiety because 
prolonged attention to threatening cues may prolong distressful states and inhibit 
attention allocation to positive stimuli and alternate coping strategies (Koster et al., 
2004). Perhaps those with high levels of shame experience prolonged attention to all 
affective stimuli due to all affective stimuli being perceived as threatening. Other 
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possibilities are that dwelling on emotional faces regardless of valence may be reflective 
of high shame individuals having difficulty interpreting facial expressions or having a 
biased interpretation of facial expressions as threatening regardless of the affect 
displayed. Future research should investigate interpretation biases in those with varying 
levels of shame.  
These observed group differences for the facilitated engagement and difficulty 
disengaging indices were consistent across affective stimuli and duration of stimulus 
exposure, contrary to our predictions. Research on domain-specificity (i.e., bias only to 
emotionally-relevant stimuli) has yielded mixed results. For example, Mogg et al., (1995) 
observed attentional biases to anxiety-relevant threatening words (“attack”, “hostile”) and 
depression-relevant words (“sad”, worthless”) in a GAD sample. Schofield, Inhoff, and 
Coles (2013) found no differences in attention biases between angry, afraid, and happy 
faces in a socially anxious sample. A potential explanation for our findings is that all 
affective information may be threatening to high shame individuals. In their research on 
social anxiety, Weeks, Heimberg, and Rodebaugh (2008) found that in addition to fear of 
negative evaluation, fear of positive public evaluation was also related to social anxiety, 
suggesting that fear of evaluation in general may increase distress in those with social 
anxiety. Perhaps those who experience high levels of shame experience similar distress 
associated with both negatively and positively valenced, social stimuli.  Future research 
on shame should continue to evaluate the effect of both negative and positive valenced 
stimuli as well as both social and non-social stimuli on attention allocation  
Although not significant, we observed some trends of domain-specificity. There 
was a trending effect for highly ashamed individuals to demonstrate attention vigilance to 
disgust faces and to avoid sad faces as measured by the conventional attention bias 
index. Interestingly, there was no difference in bias scores between disgust and happy 
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faces. Furthermore, there was a trending effect for the high shame group to exhibit 
disgust vigilance compared to the moderate shame group’s slight disgust avoidance. 
This is partly consistent with our hypothesis that attention biases would be specific to 
disgust stimuli and not sad stimuli; however, it is not clear why attention biases to 
disgust were comparable to attention biases to happy stimuli nor why disgust vigilance 
was comparable between low and high shame groups. Additionally, there was generally 
slowed engagement to affective stimuli for high shame individuals and engagement was 
particularly slow to sad faces compared to either disgust or happy faces. We also 
observed a trending effect of shame group for sad faces and happy faces. While the 
high shame group exhibited slowed engagement to sad faces, the low and moderate 
shame groups exhibited facilitated engagement to sad faces. Likewise, while the high 
shame group exhibited slightly slowed engagement to happy faces, the low and 
moderate shame groups exhibited facilitated engagement to happy faces. The trends for 
the conventional attention bias index and facilitated engagement index converge to 
suggest that high shame individuals demonstrate increased vigilance to disgust faces 
compared to sad, and high shame individuals are not as slow to engage disgust faces as 
they are to engage sad and happy faces.  This pattern provides some evidence of 
disgust vigilance for high shame individuals, partially consistent with our hypotheses. 
Alternatively, the significantly slower engagement with sad stimuli may indicate that 
individuals with high shame perceive sad stimuli as more threatening than other affect. 
Future studies should investigate the perception of various affect as threatening among 
highly ashamed individuals.  
Our data using the enhanced engagement and difficulty disengaging indices 
provided valuable information that would have been absent if we relied solely on the 
conventional attention bias scoring method. Therefore, future research should include 
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neutral-neutral trials for analyzing indices of engagement and disengagement, which 
detects more specific components of visual attention than the conventional attention bias 
index. Moreover, our inclusion of multiple affective faces provided us valuable 
information into domain-specificity. If we had relied solely on disgust stimuli, we may 
have inferred our biases were particular to shame-inducing, disgust faces.  It follows that 
future studies should include multiple affective stimuli.  
Our shame groups reported different levels of negative affect and a trend 
towards differences for positive affect.  High shame participants reported greater 
negative affect than those in the low and moderate shame groups, whereas the latter 
two groups did not differ.  In addition, low shame participants reported greater positive 
than either moderate or high shame participants, whereas there was no difference 
between the latter two groups. 
We predicted a decline in positive affect and an increase in negative affect over the 
course of the lab visit for all participants. Partially consistent with this hypothesis, we 
observed a decline in positive affect, but we also observed a decline in negative affect 
throughout the course of the visit. For positive affect there were significant declines 
across all three time points, whereas for negative affect there was a significant decline 
from baseline to midway through the dot probe task, with no further change to the end of 
the task.  Thus, contrary to expectations, we did not induce negative affect.  In fact, we 
observed a decline in all affect over the course of the lab visit. It is possible that if we 
had included a mood induction manipulation in our study, and specifically shame 
induction, we may have observed different results. Perhaps future studies could 
investigate whether trait and state shame make different contributions to attention 
biases. 
  
67 
 
There are several limitations within our study that should be noted. First, our high 
shame group also reported higher levels of depression and anxiety. This presents 
interpretive limitations in that our results may be driven by elevations of affect other than, 
or in addition to, shame. We could have used one or more measures of alternate affects 
as covariates, which may have allowed us to determine whether our results were 
specific to shame, or a reflection of attention biases in shame, anxiety, and/or 
depression. However, covarying anxiety and depression also may have attenuated any 
effects because shame is inherently confounded with depression and anxiety.  
Accordingly, removing depression and anxiety symptoms fundamentally shifts the 
phenomenon to something other than shame.  
Second, our dot probe task was quite lengthy, and our error rates were higher 
than other error rates in the literature. However, the high error rates were driven by 
relatively few participants (n = 4 with error rates over 25%). Moreover, all errors were 
deleted from our analyses and we believed the benefit of counterbalancing several 
variables, which lengthened our task, outweighed the consequences.  Third,, our dot 
probe provided three stimulus exposure durations, but did not include methods to 
measure biases at durations shorter than 150 ms, or at durations in between 150 ms 
and 500 ms and 500 ms to 1,000 ms, such as by utilizing eye tracking software.  Fourth, 
our sample was nonclinical, making it possible that our participants may not be 
experiencing shame at levels as severe as a clinical population. For example, our results 
may have been different had we intentionally recruited individuals diagnosed with PTSD, 
secondary to childhood sexual assault. Fifth, we examined trait shame, and may have 
witnessed different patterns of biases had we evaluated individuals with varying levels of 
state shame, such as by utilizing mood induction methods. Sixth, we employed a post 
hoc grouping strategy due to insufficient recruitment of our initial low shame group. It is 
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possible that our shame screener contributed to low shame individuals self-selecting 
themselves out of the study. Lastly, our evidence for domain-specificity is relatively weak 
because we included interpretation of trends in our data.  
Measurement of shame has relied on assessing cognitions, typically regarding 
fear of negative evaluation from others and the propensity to negatively evaluate 
oneself. Examining information processing mechanisms in shame allows researchers to 
further understand automatic processing that occurs in shameful affect. Thus, future 
research should continue to focus on components of information processing in shame.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Demographics 
Age ____ 
Race:_____ 
 1 – Asian or Pacific Islander 
 2 – Black/African American 
 3 – Native American 
 4 – White 
 5 –Other (please specify): ____________________ 
 99 – I do not wish to disclose this 
 
Ethnicity: Are you Hispanic? _____ 
 1 – Yes 
 2 – No 
 99 – I do not wish to disclose this 
 
Relationship status:_____ 
 1-Single, not dating 
 2-In a committed relationship 
 3-Married 
 4-Divorced/Separated 
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Appendix B: ESS  
ESS 
Everybody at times can feel embarrassed, self-conscious, or ashamed. These questions 
are about such feelings if they have occurred at any time in the past year. There are no 'right' or 
'wrong' answers. Please indicate the response which applies to you with a tick. 
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Appendix C: TOSCA-3 
TOSCA-3 
 
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, 
followed by several common reactions to those situations. 
 As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation.  Then 
indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described.  We ask you to 
rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same 
situation, or they may react different ways at different times. 
 For example: 
 
You wake up early one Saturday morning.  It is cold and rainy outside. 
a)  You would telephone a friend to catch up 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      on news.                   not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would take the extra time to read the  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      paper.             not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would feel disappointed that it’s raining. 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                    not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would wonder why you woke up so early. 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                    not likely                  very likely 
 
 
 In the above example, I’ve rated all of the answers by circling a number.  I circled 
a “1” for answer (a) because I wouldn’t want to wake up a friend very early on a 
Saturday morning—so it’s not at all likely that I would do that.  I circled a “5” for answer 
(b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely).  I 
circled a “3” for answer (c) because for me it’s about half and half.  Sometimes I would 
be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn’t—it would depend on what I 
had planned.  And I circled a “4” for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I 
had awakened so early.  
  
83 
 
Please do not skip any items—rate all responses. 
 
1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch.  At 5 o’clock, you realize you stood your 
friend up. 
a)  You would think: “I’m inconsiderate.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                                not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would think: “Well, my friend          1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              will understand.”            not likely                  very likely 
c)  You’d think you should make it up to your  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              friend as soon as possible.           not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would think: “My boss distracted me   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              just before lunch.”            not likely                  very likely 
 
 
 
 
2. You break something at work and then hide it.  
a)  You would think: “This is making me          1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              anxious.  I need to either fix it or get          not likely                  very likely 
                 someone else to.” 
b)  You would think about quitting.     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
 c)  You would think: “A lot of things aren’t  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              made very well these days.”           not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would think: “It was only an accident.”   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
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3. You are out with friends one evening, and you’re feeling especially witty and 
attractive.  Your best friend’s spouse seems to particularly enjoy your company. 
a)  You would think: “I should have been  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
       aware of what my best friend was feeling.”           not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would feel happy with your          1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              appearance and personality.           not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would feel pleased to have made  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              such a good impression.           not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would think your best friend should  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              pay attention to his/her spouse.          not likely                  very likely 
          e)  You would probably avoid eye contact  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
  for a long time.                        not likely                  very likely 
 
 
 
 
4. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly. 
a)  You would feel incompetent.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                     not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would think: “There are never enough    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              hours in the day.”            not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would feel: “I deserve to be   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      reprimanded for mismanaging the          not likely                  very likely 
       project.” 
d)  You would think: “What’s done is done.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      pay attention to his/her spouse.          not likely                  very likely  
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5. You make a mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error. 
a)  You would think the company did not like  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
        the coworker.               not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would think: “Life is not fair.”          1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would keep quiet and avoid the    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              coworker.             not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would feel unhappy and eager to  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      correct the situation.            not likely                  very likely 
 
 
6. For several days you put off making a difficult phone call.  At the last minute you 
make the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well. 
a)  You would think: “I guess I’m more   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
       persuasive than I thought.”                  not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would regret that you put it off.          1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would feel like a coward.   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would think: “I did a good job.”   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
e)  You would think you shouldn’t have to  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
 make calls you feel pressured into.                       not likely                  very likely 
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7. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face. 
a)  You would feel inadequate that you can’t  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
       even throw a ball.            not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would think maybe your friend needs     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              more practice at catching.           not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would think: “It was just an accident.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would apologize and make sure your  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      friend feels better.            not likely                  very likely 
 
 
 
8. You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very 
helpful.  A few times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as soon as 
you could. 
a)  You would feel immature.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                     not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would think: “I sure ran into some         1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              bad luck.”             not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would return the favor as quickly  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              as you could.             not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would think: “I am a trustworthy  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      person.”             not likely                  very likely 
e)  You would be proud that you repaid   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
  your debts.                         not likely                  very likely 
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9. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal. 
a)  You would think the animal shouldn’t  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
       have been on the road.             not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would think: “I’m terrible.”          1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would feel: “Well, it was an accident.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
d)  You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      driving down the road.           not likely                  very likely 
 
 
10. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well.  Then you find out you 
did poorly. 
a)  You would think: “Well, it’s just a test.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                       not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would think: “The instructor doesn’t      1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              like me.”             not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would think: “I should have   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              studied harder.”            not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would feel stupid.    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5  
                not likely                  very 
likely 
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11. You and a group of coworkers worked very hard on a project.  Your boss singles 
you out for a bonus because the project was such a success. 
a)  You would feel the boss is rather   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
       short-sighted.               not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would feel alone and apart from        1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              your colleagues.            not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would feel your hard work had     1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              paid off.             not likely                  very likely 
d)  You could feel competent and proud  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      of yourself.             not likely                  very likely 
e)  You would feel you should not accept it.  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                           not likely                  very likely 
 
 
12. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there. 
a)  You would think: “It was all in fun;   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
       it’s harmless.”               not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would feel small … like a rat.          1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would think that perhaps that friend  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              should have been there to defend          not likely                  very likely 
 him/herself. 
d)  You would apologize and talk about that  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      person’s good points.              not likely                  very likely 
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13. You make a big mistake on an important project at work.  People were depending 
on you, and your boss criticizes you. 
a)  You would think your boss should have  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
       been more clear about what was            not likely                  very likely 
            expected of you. 
b)  You would feel like you wanted to hide         1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would think: “I should have recognized  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              the problem and done a better job.”          not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would think: “Well, nobody’s perfect.”  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
 
 
 
 
 
14. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children.  It 
turns out to be frustrating and time-consuming work.  You think seriously about 
quitting, but then you see how happy the kids are. 
a)  You would feel selfish, and you’d think you  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
       are basically lazy.              not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would feel you were forced into doing    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              something you did not want to do.          not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would think: “I should be more    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              concerned about people who are less         not likely                  very likely 
                 fortunate.” 
d)  You would feel great that you had helped  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      others.             not likely                  very likely 
e)  You would feel very satisfied with yourself.  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                           not likely                  very likely 
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15. You are taking care of your friend’s dog while your friend is on vacation, and th 
dog runs away. 
a)  You would think: “I am irresponsible   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
       and incompetent.”                  not likely                  very likely 
b)  You would think your friend must not take    1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              very good care of the dog or it wouldn’t         not likely                  very likely 
 have run away. 
c)  You would vow to be more careful next time. 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
                            not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would think your friend could just get  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      a new dog.             not likely                  very likely 
 
 
 
 
16. You attend your coworker’s housewarming party and you spill red wine on a new 
cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices. 
a)  You think your coworker should have  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
       expected some accidents at suck a             not likely                  very likely 
            big party. 
b)  You would stay late to help clean up the        1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              stain after the party.            not likely                  very likely 
c)  You would wish you were anywhere   1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
              but at the party.            not likely                  very likely 
d)  You would wonder why your coworker  1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 
      chose to serve red wine with the new         not likely                  very likely 
       light carpet. 
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Appendix D: DASS-21 
DASS 21 
 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the 
statement 
applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too 
much time 
on any statement. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0 Did not apply to me at all 
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
1. I found it hard to wind down  
0  1  2  3 
2. I was aware of dryness of my mouth  
0  1  2  3 
3. I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all  
0  1  2  3 
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid breathing, breathlessness in the 
absence of physical exertion) 
0  1  2  3 
5. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things  
0  1  2  3 
6. I tended to over-react to situations  
0  1  2  3 
7. I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands)  
0  1  2  3 
8. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy  
0  1  2  3 
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9. I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool of myself 
0  1  2  3 
10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to  
0  1  2  3 
11. I found myself getting agitated  
0  1  2  3 
12. I found it difficult to relax  
0  1  2  3 
13. I felt down-hearted and blue  
0  1  2  3 
14. I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I was doing 
0  1  2  3 
15. I felt I was close to panic  
0  1  2  3 
16. I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything  
0  1  2  3 
17. I felt I wasn't worth much as a person  
0  1  2  3 
18. I felt that I was rather touchy  
0  1  2  3 
19. I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion (e.g., sense of heart 
rate increase, heart missing a beat) 
0  1  2  3 
20. I felt scared without any good reason  
0  1  2  3 
21. I felt that life was meaningless  
0  1  2  3  
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Appendix E: STAI 
SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
STAI Form Y-1 
Please provide the following information: 
Name       Date   S  
Age        Gender (Circle)    M     F    T  
   Directions: 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below.  Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the 
statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment.  There are no right 
or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the 
answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
 
 
1. I feel  calm……………………………………………………………………………………….……..…………….  1      2      3      4 
2. I feel  secure………………………………………………………………………………………………….………. 1      2      3      4 
3. I feel tense…………………………………………………………………………………………………….………  1      2      3      4 
4. I feel strained.……………………………………………………………………..…………………………….…   1      2      3      4 
5. I feel at ease……………………………………………………………………………..……………………….…   1      2      3      4 
6. I feel upset……………………………………………………………………………………..………………….…  1      2      3      4 
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes……………………………..…………….…   1      2      3      4 
8. I feel satisfied.…………………………………………………………………………………………..……….…  1      2      3      4 
9. I feel frightened.…………………………………………………………………………………………..…….…  1      2      3      4 
10. I feel comfortable……………………………………………………………………………………………...…  1      2      3      4 
11. I feel self-confident……………………………………………………………………………………….…….    1      2      3      4 
12. I feel nervous.……………………………………………………………………………………………….………  1      2      3      4 
13. I feel jittery..……………………………..……………………………………………………………………….…  1      2      3      4 
14. I feel indecisive.……………………………..………………………………………………………………….…   1      2      3      4 
15. I feel relaxed..……………………………………..…………………………………………………………….…   1      2      3      4 
16. I feel content..…………………………………………..……………………………………………………….…  1      2      3      4 
17. I feel worried..………………………………………………..………………………………………………….…  1      2      3      4 
18. I feel confused……………………………………………………..…………………………………………….…   1      2      3     4 
19. I feel steady.……………………………………………………………..……………………………………….…  1      2      3      4 
20. I feel pleasant.………………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
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SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
STAI Form Y-2 
Name         Date    
   DIRECTIONS 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves 
are given below.  Read each statement and then circle the appropriate 
number to the right of the statement to indicate how you generally feel. 
21. I feel pleasant.………………………………………………………………..………………………………….  1      2      3      4 
22. I feel nervous and restless….………………………………………..………………………………...…… 1      2      3      4 
23. I feel satisfied with myself……………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
24. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be……………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
25. I feel like a failure…………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
26. I feel rested….………………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
27. I am “calm, cool, and collected”……………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them………….……….… 1      2      3      4 
29. I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter…………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
30. I am happy…...………………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
31. I have disturbing thoughts……………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
32. I lack self-confidence……………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
33. I feel secure….………………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
34. I make decisions easily…………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
35. I feel inadequate.…………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
36. I am content...………………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
37. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me………………….… 1      2      3      4 
38. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind………………… 1      2      3      4 
39. I am a steady person.……………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1      2      3      4 
40. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests… 1      2      3      4  
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Appendix F: SPIN 
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) 
Please read each statement and select a number 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 which indicates how much the 
statement applied to you over the past week.   
 
0 = Not at all   1 = A little bit   2 = Somewhat   3 = Very much  4 = Extremely 
 
 
1. I am afraid of people in authority _____ 
 
2. I am bothered by blushing in front of people _____ 
 
3. Parties and social events scare me _____ 
 
4. I avoid talking to people I don’t know _____ 
 
5. Being criticized scares me a lot _____ 
 
6. I avoid doing things or speaking to people for fear of embarrassment _____ 
 
7. Sweating in front of people causes me distress _____ 
 
8. I avoid going to parties _____ 
 
9. I avoid activities in which I am the center of attention _____ 
 
10. Talking to strangers scares me _____ 
 
11. I avoid giving speeches _____ 
 
12. I would do anything to avoid being criticized _____ 
 
13. Heart palpitations bother me when I am around people _____ 
 
14. I am afraid of doing things when people might be watching _____ 
 
15. Being embarrassed or looking stupid are my worst fears _____ 
 
16. I avoid speaking to anyone in authority _____ 
 
17. Trembling or shaking in front of others is distressing to me _____ 
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Appendix G: PANAS 
 
 
PANAS 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to the word. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way RIGHT NOW. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
slightly 
or 
not at all 
a little moderately quite a bit extreme 
 
 
______ interested  ______ irritable 
______ distressed   ______ alert 
______ excited   ______ ashamed 
______ upset   ______ inspired 
______ strong   ______ nervous 
______ guilty   ______ determined 
______ scared   ______ attentive 
______ hostile   ______ jittery 
______ enthusiastic   ______ active 
______ proud   ______ afraid 
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